Searching for the Electoral Connection: Parliamentary Party Switching In the Ukrainian Rada, 1998–2002

Studies of legislative behavior almost universally begin with the assumption that legislators desire reelection. For scholars who study the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, this assumption is perhaps tenuous, given the weaknesses of political parties and the significant party switching. Yet an analysis of party switching between 1998 and 2002 using a new method that controls for selection bias demonstrates that, although turnover among parties was high, this turnover followed an electoral logic: deputies changed parties, in part, to secure reelection. Thus, the electoral connection, assumed in so much of the legislative behavior literature, existed even in the chaotic Rada.     

POLICE INTERVENTION AND THE REPEAT OF DOMESTIC ASSAULT

We use the National Crime Victimization Survey to examine whether domestic violence is less likely to be repeated if it is reported to the police and if the offender is arrested. Our longitudinal analyses suggest that reporting has a fairly strong deterrent effect, whereas the effect of arrest is small and statistically insignificant. We find no support for the hypothesis that offenders retaliate when victims (rather than third parties) call the police or when victims sign complaints. We also find no evidence that the effects of reporting or arrest depend on the seriousness of the offense, a history of violence by the offender or sociodemographic characteristics. Our results suggest that the best policies for deterrence will be those that encourage victims and third parties to report violence by intimate partners to the police.