Exploring the link between patronage and party institutionalization: an historical-institutional analysis of the Italian transition

This article analyses party patronage transformations in Italy since the early 1990s, a time when political parties and the party system entered a phase of continuing change. It examines how the interaction between the temporality of party system restructuring and historical legacies rooted in the nature of public bureaucracies reproduced patronage practices aimed at capturing state resources. The article employs a historical institutionalist approach as a research framework and concludes that this provides a cogent explanatory argument for the development of state exploitation taken by Italian political parties since the crisis of the early 1990s.     

Context and Mechanisms in Administrative Reform Processes: Performance Management Within Italian Local Government

ABSTRACT

This article aims to present new research on the politics of public management reform in Napoleonic countries. Drawing on the institutional processualist approach, the empirical analysis tracks and explains the trajectory and outcomes of episodes where performance management has been introduced at the local level in Italy. The comparative case analysis shows that plausible causal explanation of the outcomes of public management reform can occur only if researchers are attentive to the interaction between social mechanisms and contextual features together with their interconnections through time.     

Empirical Modeling of Policy Diffusion in Federal States: The Dyadic Approach

Policy diffusion is a common phenomenon in federal states: indeed, one of the normative justifications of decentralized policy making is that it permits the development and spread of best practices. Following Berry and Berry (1990), event‐history analysis has been the method of choice for the quantitative investigation of policy diffusion, but Volden (2006) has recently introduced a dyadic variant of this method in which units of analysis are not states but, instead, pairs of states. This article discusses the dyadic approach with a particular focus on the diffusion of policies in Switzerland. The goal is not to introduce a new method, but rather to provide a practical overview for researchers interested in using it. The article shows how the method has migrated from the international relations literature to the policy‐diffusion literature, describes the typical structure of a dyadic dataset in a diffusion context, and discusses several modeling issues. The usefulness of the dyadic approach is illustrated empirically with the example of health‐insurance subsidy policies in Swiss cantons.     

Policy Diffusion: The Issue‐Definition Stage

We put forward a new approach to studying issue definition within the context of policy diffusion. Most studies of policy diffusion—which is the process by which policymaking in one government affects policymaking in other governments—have focused on policy adoptions. We shift the focus to an important but neglected aspect of this process: the issue‐definition stage. We use topic models to estimate how policies are framed during this stage and how these frames are predicted by prior policy adoptions. Focusing on smoking restriction in U.S. states, our analysis draws upon an original data set of over 52,000 paragraphs from newspapers covering 49 states between 1996 and 2013. We find that frames regarding the policy's concrete implications are predicted by prior adoptions in other states, whereas frames regarding its normative justifications are not. Our approach and findings open the way for a new perspective to studying policy diffusion in many different areas.     

Conflict of interest regulation in European parliaments: Studying the evolution of complex regulatory regimes

The growing complexity of parliamentary ethics regulation adopted over the last decades makes the systematic examination of its nature and the rationales underpinning regulatory choices an important endeavor. In this paper we introduce conceptualizations and measurements of conflict of interest (COI) regulation directed toward assuring the impartial and unbiased decisionmaking of national parliamentarians. We distinguish the strictness of rules, the nature of enforcement, sanctions, and transparency requirements as core elements defining COI regimes. Applying our framework to 27 European democracies, we select two cases for in‐depth analysis in which legislators chose very different solutions in response to growing pressures to regulate themselves, to inductively explore the drivers underpinning the choice of COI mechanisms: the United Kingdom, which adopted a highly transparency‐oriented regime, and Belgium, which adopted a highly sanction‐oriented COI regime. Echoing neo‐institutionalist perspectives, the longitudinal analyses indicate how the two democracies’ different institutional environments shape distinct answers to similar functional pressures.     

Implementing Risk Management in the Italian Public Sector: Hybridization between Old and New Practices

Though Risk Management (RM) entered the public sector, the way RM is introduced within organizations is not empirically explored. Analyzing the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) case study through the theoretical lens of institutional perspective, the paper responds to the call for more organizational studies of RM: nature and dynamics of RM are investigated, offering a valid contribution to the debate on practice of public management related to work practices and knowledge systems. The results show that RM is now embedded in ISTAT activities, processes, culture and individual behaviors, confirming the opportunity to improve both organizational performance and learning.     

The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors

This article seeks to explain the pattern of delegation to independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Two types of arguments are advanced to explain variations in the formal independence of regulators. Firstly, the need for governments to increase their credible commitment capacity may lead them to delegate regulation to an agency that is partly beyond their direct control. Secondly, delegation may be a response to the political uncertainty problem, which arises when governments are afraid of being replaced by another coalition with different preferences, which could decide to change existing policy choices. In addition, veto players may constitute a functional equivalent of delegation, since they influence policy stability and therefore tend to mitigate both the credibility and the political uncertainty problems. These arguments are consistent with the results of the empirical analysis of the formal independence of regulators in seventeen countries and seven sectors.     

Publication Output of Swiss Political Science Departments

This article compares the scientific publication output and international academic visibility of Swiss political science departments, using three indicators (number of publications, number of citations, and the h‐index) and publicly available data from two sources: the ISI Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar. We also examine whether the publication output of political science professors and postdoctoral researchers in Switzerland varies as a function of academic age. We observe rather strong variations both across and within departments. The analysis also shows that the most prolific professors tend to be those who completed their Ph.D. about 10–20 years ago and that some postdocs are on a very promising publications trajectory. We derive some benchmarks for publication output that might be useful for hiring decisions or promotions.     

Regulatory capabilities: A normative framework for assessing the distributional effects of regulation

This paper develops the normative concept of “regulatory capabilities.” It asserts that nobody – individuals, groups, or entities – should be subjected to a regulatory regime without some freedom to determine its nature. Self‐determination in this context means the ability to accept or reject a regulatory regime imposed by others or to develop viable alternative approaches. We use the term “regulatory capabilities” to capture the importance of enabling conditions for regulatory self‐determination. This is particularly important in the transnational context where private, hybrid public–private, and public actors compete for influence, shape domestic regulation, and, in doing so, limit the scope for democratic self‐governance. In short, this paper seeks to contribute to the general debate on the normative foundations of and the requisite conditions for transnational regulation and governance.