Stress-related temporary hearing loss--evaluation of bio-humoral parameters: forensic and criminological applications

The body-alarm reaction results from the activation of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, which can lead to physio-psychological phenomena such as an exclusion/occlusion of the sense of hearing. One hypothesis to explain this alteration consists in a hydromechanical dysfunction of the internal ear attributable to antidiuretic hormone. In this study, we evaluated the perception of acoustic stimuli administered in stressful conditions in 14 phobic patients and in 20 healthy subjects, in order to assess the influence of stress on perceiving capabilities. We also measured the concentration of salivary cortisol and IL-1β and neurovegetative parameters to objectivise and quantify the physiological reactions. Our results show a worse perception of the frequencies of the human voice under stress; these findings could have a dual value: in the legal field, concerning criminal liability, and on the operative context, regarding the efficiency of verbal communication among law enforcement officers in situations inducing intense emotional stress.     

2004年《意大利民法典》公司法编之特点

一、自治、透明、简化 2004年1月1日生效的公司法的修改,是<意大利民法典>自诞生以来的60年中最为巨大的和最有组织化的变革.由调整资本公司与合作公司的法律所产生的变革是一种深刻的变革、一种根本的变革、一种更符合市场经济规则的变革.     

Constructing Common Cultures: The Ontological and Normative Dimensions of Law in the European Union and Mercosur

Existing research suggests that the European Union (EU) has avoided the formal construction of a supranational culture. Theories in economic sociology predict that market building should entail the concomitant articulation of basic cultural material, above all of ontological and normative notions about the world. In this article we confirm that the EU has formally engaged in cultural construction. Through its system of secondary laws, the EU has in fact produced complex webs of ontological notions about the essence of objects, activities and agents, and of normative notions about the desirability of various situations. Analysis of the content of EU directives and regulations in the areas of working conditions, flora and fauna, and honey supports this claim. Analysis of national reactions and cultural contexts highlights the salience and distinctiveness of the emerging supranational culture. Evidence that Mercosur too has engaged in the production of ontological and normative notions suggests that, in line with the expectations of economic sociology, the EU is not unique, though the two markets can construct different notions when addressing identical subject matters. The implications of the findings for European enlargement and the comparative study of common markets are discussed.     

Political Coase Theorem

This article considers theapplicability of the Coase theorem (in bothits positive and normative formulations) tothe political market. The articleanalogizes the choice of decision rules inthe political market to the choice of legalrules in the traditional Coase theorem andfurther analogizes alternative initialcoalitions to the different initialallocations of entitlements considered byCoase (1960). On the basis of theseanalogies, the paper examines the relevance(or lack thereof) of alternative votingrules and initial coalitions on the finalpolitical outcome. The article furthershows that, if all voters are allowed toenter into Coasian bargaining over thepolicy outcome to be adopted by themajority coalition (i.e., if politicalbargains are possible and are enforceable),uniqueness and stability are obtained. Theanalysis of the axiomatic Nash bargainingequilibrium yields an interesting geometricintuition. If voters have similar utilityfunctions centered around different idealpolicy points, the Coasian bargaining willbe conducive to the ``center of mass'' of thepolicy space, which weighs the agents'preferences as revealed in the bargainingprocess. Such ideal equilibrium satisfiesmost criteria of social welfare. Thearticle concludes considering the variouspractical limits of this ideal politicalmarket, whenever collective action andagency problems affect the politicalbargaining in a representative or directdemocracy. With all side payments prohibited,there is no assurance that collectiveaction will be taken in the most productiveway. (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, 1962)     

Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model

In this paper we build uponexisting literature on the evolution of thecommon law. We consider a model of legalevolution in which judges have varyingideologies and propensities to extend thedomain of legal remedies and causes ofaction. Parties have symmetric stakes andare rational. Plaintiffs bring a case tocourt if the expected net return from thecase is positive. The net expected value ofthe case depends on the objective merits ofthe case, the state of the law, and theideological propensity of the judge.Plaintiffs have full control over whetherto bring a case to court. In our model, thecombined presence of differences in judges'ideology and plaintiff's case selectiongenerate a monotonic upward trend in theevolution of legal rules and remedies. This may explain the stylized fact underwhich certain areas of the law have beengranting increasing levels of remedialprotection and recognition of plaintiffs'actions.