政治附庸还是忠诚公仆?——关于日本司法系统的两种看法

本文分析了二战后头五十年内关于日本司法系统的两种观点。一种观点认为日本法官自愿成为执政党的政治附庸,另一种则认为他们是世界上最独立和诚实的司法人员。双方都同意,作为日本司法系统的特征,对个体法官进行紧密的官僚制控制使得司法系统统一并且和谐运转,但这也导致了日本法官更趋向于服从重森严的等级,而非法律的教义。就这一点而言,日本司法系统可能成为其他国家,比如中国的可借鉴利用的模型,因为后者正在缺乏大量法律从业人员的情况下建设新的司法系统。必须注意的是,日本司法系统是在能够缓和极权倾向的有效民主制度中运行的。作为最终的结论,所有的司法系统都是极具政治性的,他们的所有工作都是以其自身所处的制度文化和政治文化为背景而展开的。本文也分析了各持上述一种观点的两位学者间互相冲突的方法论:马克·拉姆塞耶的回归分析和理性选择假说以及约翰·黑利的传统比较法制度历史分析。本文比较了两种方法论的强处和弱处,并体现了以下两点:第一,至少在这里,定量分析进路强调了个体选择的作用,而定性分析则强调了制度设置;第二,尽管定性分析能提供更为宽广的叙述,但也以故事中空白情节的人为虚构和因此造成的结果走样为代价。     

Underinvestment in Public Good Technologies

Although underinvestment phenomena are the rationale for government subsidization of research and development (R&D), the concept is poorly defined and its impact is seldom quantified. Conceptually, underinvestment in industrial R&D can take the form of either a wrong amount or a suboptimal composition of R&D investment. In both cases, R&D policy has not adequately modeled the relevant economic phenomena and thus is unable to characterize, explain, and measure the underinvestment. Four factors can cause systematic underinvestment in R&D-intensive industries: complexity, timing, existence of economies of scale and scope, and spillovers. The impacts of these factors vary in intensity over the typical technology life cycle, so government policy responses must be managed dynamically. In addition to understanding the causes of underinvestment in R&D, the magnitude of the deficiency relative to some “optimum” must be estimated to enable a ranking of technology areas with respect to expected net economic benefits from a government subsidy. Project selection criteria must therefore be based on quantitative and qualitative indicators that represent the nature and the magnitude of identified market failures. The major requirement for management of R&D policy therefore is a methodology that regularly assesses long-term expected benefits and risks from current and proposed R&D portfolios. To this end, a three-stage process is proposed to effectively carry out R&D policy analysis. The three stages are (1) identify and explain the causes of the underinvestment, (2) characterize and assess the investment trends and their impacts, and (3) estimate the magnitude of the underinvestment relative to a perceived optimum in terms of its cost to the economy. Only after all three stages of analysis have been completed can the underinvestment pattern be matched with the appropriate policy response.     

Correlates of crime in Taiwan

Taiwan is known for rapid economic growth, but in 1988, the government ended 40 years of martial law, resulting in greater political and social freedoms. This paper explores the influence of economic, social, and political structures on crime in the Republic of China on Taiwan. A time series analysis examines the structural correlates of crime in Taiwan from 1964 to 1990. Both total crime and burglary/larceny rates are regressed on seven independent variables derived from various theoretical perspectives. The results support Hagan's power-control and Christie's crime-industry perspectives for total crime, while measures assessing lack of economic means and the economic deprivation were significant for burglary/larceny.     

The 'Lessons' of Dictatorship: Political Learning and the Military in Chile

This article argues that political learning with regard to civil-military relations in Chile has proved an obstacle to democratization. In the postauthoritarian period, both the armed forces and political parties have referred to history when considering civil-military reform, especially with regard to how to avoid a repeat of the conflict of the Unidad Popular period. Meanwhile, the military also utilizes the Spanish example when resisting changes it feels are inimical to its interests. The 'lessons' each takes from the past directly influence political strategies and the overall result is that while civilian rule continues, democratic civil-military relations are not necessarily advanced.