The Potential for Local Diversity in Implementation of the National Competition Policy

Australian governments have embarked on a major effort to improve the competitiveness of the economy by adoption of a national competition policy (NCP). The policy extends the scope of trade practices legislation to encompass the public sector and professions, modernises policy in the areas of pricing and access powers, and is intended to revitalise the microeconomic reform agenda. The intended result is an integrated national economy, more uniform and consistent business regulation across the country and improved levels of competitiveness. But, there is an inherent tension between the imperatives for harmonisation, uniformity and reduced regulation on the one hand and tendencies for local diversity and increased regulation on the other. This article explores this tension with illustrations taken from three key aspects of the policy — opportunities for institutional diversity, treatment of the public interest and the prognosis for an integrated national, competitive market. The potential for each jurisdiction in Australia to take diverse and problematic approaches to the implementation of competition policy is then re-examined through the mechanism of a specialised case study involving the regulation of access to gas pipelines in Western Australia.     

B. Reviews: general

DISCOVERING ISLAM: MAKING SENSE OF MUSLIM HISTORY AND SOCIETY. By AKBAR S. AHMED. London and New York, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1988. 251pp.

THE CRUSADES THROUGH ARAB EYES. By AMIN MAALOUF. Translated by JON ROTHSCHILD. London, Al‐Saqi Books, 1984 (first published as Les Croisades vues par les Arabes, Paris, 1983). 295 pp., 2 maps.

THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST. By HAIM GERBER. Boulder, Lynne Rienner/London, Mansell, 1987. 300pp. £26.50 (U.K.)

PAN‐ARABISM AND ARAB NATIONALISM: THE CONTINUING DEBATE. Edited by TAWFIC E. FARAH. London/Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1987. 208pp., notes, tables.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN THE ARAB STATES. Edited by TAWFIC E. FARAH and YASUMASA KURODA. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1987. vii‐xiv, 215pp.

ZIONISM AND THE ARABS, 1882–1948: A STUDY OF IDEOLOGY. By YOUSEF GORNY. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987. 342pp. £32.50.

SHI'ISM, RESISTANCE, AND REVOLUTION. Edited by MARTIN KRAMER. Boulder, Co., Westview/London, Mansell, 1987. 324pp.

EGYPT: INTERNAL CHALLENGES AND REGIONAL STABILITY. Edited by LILLIAN CRAIG HARRIS. (Chatham House Papers, 39.) London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988. 116pp. £5.95.

PALESTINIAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT. By SAMIR N. ANABTAWI. London, KPI, 1986. 84pp. 1 map, tables.

POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY IN SYRIA. Edited by J.A. ALLAN. London, Centre for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1987. 142pp., maps, figs., tables.

IRAQ SINCE 1958: FROM REVOLUTION TO DICTATORSHIP. By MARION FAROUK‐SLUGLETT AND PETER SLUGLETT. London, KPI, 1987. 332pp. £12.95.

LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEMPORARY YEMEN: THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AND THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC. By S.H. AMIN. Glasgow, Royston Ltd., 1987. vi, 159pp. £18.75

TRANSLATIONS OF EASTERN POETRY AND PROSE. By REYNOLD ALLEYNE NICHOLSON, with a new Introduction by C.E. Bosworth. London, Curzon Press/New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1987 (first published 1922). xvi, 200pp, 5 plates. £5.50.

FROM THE IVORY TOWER: A CRITICAL STUDY OF TAWFIQ AL‐HAKIM. By PAUL STARKEY. (St Antony's Middle East Monographs, no.19.) London, Ithaca Press, 1987. 260pp. £18.00.

IRAN: AT WAR WITH HISTORY. By JOHN W. LIMBERT. (Profiles: Nations of the Contemporary Middle East.) Boulder, Co., Westview Press/London and Sydney, Croom Helm, 1987. xviii, 186pp., 5 maps, 12 photographs, glossary, chronology and index. £25.00.

IMAM RÜHULLAH KHUMAINI, ?AH MUHAMMAD RIZA PAHLAVI AND THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF IRAN. By GUDMAR ANEER. (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Historia Religionum, 8.) Uppsala, 1985. (Distributor: Almqvist and Wiksell International, Stockholm.) 93pp., 7 colour plates.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: GOD, MAN AND THE UNIVERSE. By AYATULLAH MURTAZA MUTAHHARI. Translated by R. CAMPBELL. Berkeley, Mizan Press, 1985. 235pp.

SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CHANGE: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE. By AYATULLAH MURTAZA MUTAHHARI. Translated by R. CAMPBELL. Berkeley, Mizan Press. 1986. 164pp.

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN IRAN: FROM MONARCHY TO ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. By KAMRAN MOFID. Cambridgeshire, MENAS Press, 1987. 320pp., tables and figures, notes, bibliography.

THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF POLITICAL LIFE: RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAHLAVI IRAN. By GRACE GOODELL. Oxford, O.U.P., 1986. 326pp.

BANKING AND EMPIRE IN IRAN (THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH BANK OF THE MIDDLE EAST, VOLUME I). By GEOFFREY JONES. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, xxiv, 418pp. £40.00.

PAKISTAN SOCIETY: ISLAM, ETHNICITY AND LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH ASIA. By AKBAR S. AHMED. Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1986. 279pp.

TOWARD ISLAMIC ANTHROPOLOGY: DEFINITION, DOGMA AND DIRECTIONS. By AKBAR S. AHMED. Ann Arbor, Michigan, New Era Publications/London, al‐Quds Publications, 1986.79pp. $6.00.

HÉRITER EN PAYS MUSULMAN: HABUS, LAIT VIVANT, MANYAHULI. Edited by MARCEAU GAST. Paris, Editions du C.N.R.S., 1987. 302pp. (French and English abstracts to p. 296; Index of vernacular terms to p. 302). FF. 130.

OPEC: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB. By SHUKRI M. GHANEM. London, Kegan Paul International, 1986. 233pp. £30.00.

OPEC AID AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT. Edited by ABDELKADER BENAMARA and SAM IFEAGWU. London, Croom Helm, 1987. 130pp. £25.00.

SYRIA AND IRAN: THREE STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL CERAMICS. Edited by JAMES ALLAN and CAROLINE ROBERTS. Oxford, O.U.P., 1987. 248pp. £25.00.     

Preemptive and reactive spending in U.S. House races

This paper examines the spending behavior of candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives. Particular attention is paid to the timing of receipts and expenditures over the complete 2-year election cycle. Incumbents raise and spend large amounts of money very early in the race, and this preemptive spending may have a great impact on the selection of challengers and therefore on electoral outcomes. In addition, a model of reactive spending is tested for the general election period. Incumbents' expenditures are a function of the underlying partisan division in the district, the strength of the challenge, and candidates' feelings of vulnerability. Incumbents are strategic actors who attempt to maximize their chances of reelection. Early in the term, they spend preemptively in an effort to influence the selection of their challengers. Later in the term, they spend in reaction to the strength of their challengers' campaign. The role of money in congressional campaigns is neither simple nor direct. More attention needs to be given to the strategic uses of money in the period leading up to the general election campaign as well as to the dynamics of receipts and expenditures over an entire election cycle.     

The Things Negotiators Do With Money

Deal-making negotiations, in the minds of most people, center on theamount of money that is involved in a transaction. However, the timing ofa money transfer, the different methods of payment, and the addition ofother parties to a negotiation are all factors that sometimes are just asimportant as the amount of the transaction. The author uses case examplesfrom a variety of recent negotiations to illustrate some of the ways thatthe who, when, and how of a deal can have significant impact on a negotiationprocess.     

How academic researchers select collaborative research projects: a choice experiment

The Journal of Technology Transfer - Although many studies have been conducted on the drivers of and barriers to research collaborations, current literature provides limited insights into the ways...     

The Coleman–Shapley index: being decisive within the coalition of the interested

Public Choice - The Coleman power of a collectivity to act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to that measure, we...     

Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs

Economic elites regularly seek to exert political influence. But what policies do they support? Many accounts implicitly assume economic elites are homogeneous and that increases in their political power will increase inequality. We shed new light on heterogeneity in economic elites' political preferences, arguing that economic elites from an industry can share distinctive preferences due in part to sharing distinctive predispositions. Consequently, how increases in economic elites' influence affect inequality depends on which industry's elites are gaining influence and which policy issues are at stake. We demonstrate our argument with four original surveys, including the two largest political surveys of American economic elites to date: one of technology entrepreneurs—whose influence is burgeoning—and another of campaign donors. We show that technology entrepreneurs support liberal redistributive, social, and globalistic policies but conservative regulatory policies—a bundle of preferences rare among other economic elites. These differences appear to arise partly from their distinctive predispositions.     

On the Meaning of Survey Reports of Roll‐Call “Votes”

Contemporary efforts to evaluate representation often compare survey measures of how citizens say they would vote on legislation to what elected officials do in office. These comparisons generally suggest poor representation. We argue here that this common design is unlikely to effectively evaluate representation because responses to survey questions differ in important aspects from voting in legislatures. Measurement error and construct validity undermine the comparison. Three survey experiments show that providing partisan and nonpartisan information readily available to legislators materially changes respondents' expressed preferences on roll‐call votes. With information, expressed policy positions are both less centrist and more closely matched to legislator behavior in their preferred party. Respondents also appear aware of their own lack of knowledge in evaluating roll‐call policy votes. The treatment effect of information decreases in confidence judging policy in that area. We show similar patterns for respondent opinions on Supreme Court decisions.