A Cross-cultural Validation of the Brief Child Abuse Potential Inventory (BCAP)

The aim of this study was to provide preliminary findings on the cross-cultural validation and reliability of the Brief Child Abuse Potential Inventory (BCAP) developed by Ondersma et al. (Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 2005). A community sample of 324 parents was recruited through schools from a range of socioeconomic areas in a large UK city. The BCAP appears to be a reliable instrument that is easy to use and shows promise as a brief screening tool for parental child abuse potential within the UK. Modifications are suggested to the validity scales and the conceptual structure based on this sample, however, detailed testing of the utility of this scale for clinical practice outside the US should be pursued.     

Control and controls: A reexamination of control patterns in budget execution

Consistent choice in an inconsistent world requires processes both for rational calculation and effective control. The budgetary process incorporates both of these functions. However, students of public sector budgeting tend either to ignore budget execution or to view the time expended by budgeteers on the execution of budgets - as opposed to their construction - as a gross misallocation of resources. In the authors' opinion this perspective - or lack thereof - seriously undervalues the control function and the budgeteer's role in preventing control loss. At the same time, the authors acknowledge that budgeteers frequently misuse the controls at their disposal and that in certain cases (i.e., where competitive supply of a public service is justified and in effect) expenditure controls are redundant and serve no real purpose.Budget execution is primarily concerned with two kinds of expenditure controls, allotment controls and fund reports, and is supported by position controls. The immediate purpose of these controls is to insure that purchases are limited to the amounts and purposes specified in the budget act. However, given the typical relationship between the budget agency and the operating bureau, we argue that their ultimate function is to prevent the bureau from distorting or concealing cost and production information so as to increase its bargaining power, thereby permitting the budget office to insure that the preferences of the state are at least approximately met. Performance standards and control rules also serve to avoid inconsistency in the dealings between the budgeteer and the bureau and to stabilize expectations about the ground rules for bargaining and the likely outcomes of the bargaining process so as to reduce the costs of uncertainty to both sides.