Control and controls: A reexamination of control patterns in budget execution

Consistent choice in an inconsistent world requires processes both for rational calculation and effective control. The budgetary process incorporates both of these functions. However, students of public sector budgeting tend either to ignore budget execution or to view the time expended by budgeteers on the execution of budgets - as opposed to their construction - as a gross misallocation of resources. In the authors' opinion this perspective - or lack thereof - seriously undervalues the control function and the budgeteer's role in preventing control loss. At the same time, the authors acknowledge that budgeteers frequently misuse the controls at their disposal and that in certain cases (i.e., where competitive supply of a public service is justified and in effect) expenditure controls are redundant and serve no real purpose.Budget execution is primarily concerned with two kinds of expenditure controls, allotment controls and fund reports, and is supported by position controls. The immediate purpose of these controls is to insure that purchases are limited to the amounts and purposes specified in the budget act. However, given the typical relationship between the budget agency and the operating bureau, we argue that their ultimate function is to prevent the bureau from distorting or concealing cost and production information so as to increase its bargaining power, thereby permitting the budget office to insure that the preferences of the state are at least approximately met. Performance standards and control rules also serve to avoid inconsistency in the dealings between the budgeteer and the bureau and to stabilize expectations about the ground rules for bargaining and the likely outcomes of the bargaining process so as to reduce the costs of uncertainty to both sides.     

Religion,liberty and economic development: An empirical investigation

The empirical investigations conducted for this paper show that one can not accept the null hypothesis that religion and liberty are not related to development. Judeo-Christianity in particular appears to an important determinant of economic development. This is explained in part by its fostering of the private ownership of property. Nations with the Judeo-Christian values are more likely to have political democracies that are conductive to economic development. Capitalist economies with Judeo-Christian democracy are more likely to have higher levels of economic development.