COUNTING CRIME BOOMS AMONG NATIONS: EVIDENCE FOR HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION RATES, 1956 TO 1998*

Constructionists argue that crime booms are rare, modernizationalists predict that booms have been limited to industrializing nations, and globalizationalists claim that booms are universal among nations since World War II. We define crime booms as rates that increase rapidly and exhibit a positive sustained change in direction and use econometric methods to test for booms with homicide victimization rates for 34 nations, 1956 to 1998. Twelve nations satisfied our criteria for booms—too many to support constructionists, but too few to support globalizationalists. In support of modernizationalists, 70% of industrializing nations qualified as having booms, but fewer than 21% of industrialized nations did. Future research should explain industrializing nations that do not experience booms and industrialized nations that do.     

EDUCATION,EDUCATION, EDUCATION: THE THIRD WAY AND PFI

In 1997, New Labour set about the task of reforming public services in the United Kingdom through the use of an ideology that became known as the ‘Third Way’. This research examines the context from which this concept emerged, and explores its relationship with the tools of delivery, with particular reference to the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The paper begins by reviewing the Third Way, before analysing the arguments for and against PFI. Using an example from the Northern Ireland education sector, the paper argues that the characteristics associated with the Third Way are mirrored in the operational tools of public service delivery, such as PFI. The paper concludes that, within the context of the case study reviewed, there is a ‘consistent pragmatism’ in play in relation to how these delivery initiatives are operated and how they relate to their conceptual underpinnings.     

Juvenile Accountability and the Specific Deterrent Effects of Short‐Term Confinement

To assess the specific deterrent (“teaching a lesson”) and normative validation effects of confinement, the intake histories of a random sample of youths (n=87) confined in a local detention facility were analyzed to determine if the amount of the immediately previous confinement or the total amount of confinement experienced affects the amount of time until the next system intake. No statistically significant relationships were found for any of the intakes, up through eight intakes. The findings, however, demonstrate that a non‐graduated approach to imposition of punishment that did not adequately emphasize individual accountability was not an effective deterrent for the more recalcitrant youths included in this study. Theoretical and policy implications of the findings are discussed.     

MANAGING RAPE: EXPLORATORY RESEARCH ON THE BEHAVIOR OF RAPE STATISTICS*

This article explores interpretations of the UCR-NCS disparity in rape rates within the context of recent debates and research about the UCR-NCS relationship. Analysis of a variety of survey, organizational, and employee data together with UCR and NCS crime data yields a pattern of findings that makes sense if two assumptions are made: Downward trends in NCS data are an approximation of trends in the real rate of rape, and upward trends in UCR data are primarily a product of changes in the management of rape cases. The common attribution of disparities between UCR and NCS rape data to changes in public or victim reporting receives little support when compared with explanations stressing organizational change. Upward movement in official attention to rape could, in fact, account for downward movement in NCS rape rates. The implications of recent NCS efforts to improve the official measurement of rape for the future behavior of rape statistics are also considered.     

Assessing the President's Role as Party Agent in Congressional Elections: The Case of Bill Clinton in 2000

Presidents have become their parties' chief fund‐raisers and thus have the capacity to further their parties' collective fortunes by imposing a more efficient distribution of campaign resources than might otherwise prevail. In order to succeed, presidents must, first, accurately target their efforts where they will best improve candidates' prospects for winning seats, and second, either directly or indirectly (through signaling to other donors) generate sufficient new resources to affect the election outcome. Analyses of Bill Clinton's extensive fund‐raising efforts during the 1999–2000 election cycle confirm that presidents can indeed use their unmatched fund‐raising ability to help their parties win congressional contests they might otherwise lose. But analysis of the Clinton record also shows that presidential fund‐raising activities may be shaped by other purposes that lead to a distribution of effort that is suboptimal for the party.     

The Right to a Family Environment for "Children Living in Exceptionally Difficult Conditions"

Building on earlier, non-binding international instruments, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides a right to a family environment for children in general, but it also elaborates this right in a variety of contexts in which children are in especially difficult conditions. These provisions are legally binding in the scores of countries that have ratified the Convention. Such provisions are also illustrative of the Convention's conceptual coherence and comprehensiveness, its broad "constitutional" language, and its establishment of structures for monitoring and implementation.     

GENERAL DETERRENCE AND TELEVISION CABLE CRIME: A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL CONTROL*

This research examines the deterrent effect of a written legal threat on a group of persons who are known to be receiving an unauthorized premium cable television signal. The experiment attempts to determine (1) the overall violation rate: (2) the extent to which violators direr from a systematic random sample of cable signal customers (according to age, total household income, and gender); and (3) the deterrent effect of the threat of intervention. Additionally, a six-month follow-up was conducted to assess the duration of the threat's effect. Overall, two thirds of the subjects (n=67) reacted to the threat; the major reaction to the threat was an attempt to hide the violation. There were some differences found regarding participation in cable crime and deterrence, but none reached a reliable level of statistical significance. Regarding deterrence, the findings that males heeded the threat least and that the youngest and richest also showed low desistance rates after exposure to the threat are consistent with previous research. Regarding participation in cable crime, the youngest and richest seem to be involved more often in the pilfering of signals. The follow-up revealed that the deterrent effect of the intervention lasted at least six months. The benefits of using experimentation as a general deterrence research strategy are emphasized throughout.