The power of international criminal courts: Strategic behavior and accountability networks

International criminal courts are often given mandates without the authority or resources to enforce those directives. Given this, how do they achieve their objectives? We argue that in the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the court strategically developed an accountability network comprised of governmental and nongovernmental actors, using its expertise and position to provide information and a framework of accountability. Simultaneously, it reached out to a range of actors to ensure that governments and international organizations would push Balkan states to cooperate with the ICTY, thereby amplifying the court's power. Utilizing correspondence data, we create a unique dataset that traces the development of this accountability network, demonstrating how this institution engaged networks to pursue its goals. In general, we demonstrate that, although institutions may lack compulsory power, they can engage in strategic behavior using networks to project their productive power.     

Deeper Commitment to Human Rights Treaties: Signaling and Investment Risk Perception

Why do some leaders make deeper commitments to human rights treaties (HRAs) by consenting to receive extra monitoring of complaints or communications from individual citizens? Extant theory suggests leaders join HRAs for tangible benefits. However, empirical support for this argument is mixed. To address this mismatch, we approach this question from a different angle. We argue that by ratifying HRAs, leaders send a signal that they are reliable partners who value future returns. Accepting optional articles and protocols that increase monitoring of the state’s human rights behavior, without changing the state’s substantive obligations, helps better signal that the regime does not fear instability nor sees the need to resort to the proscribed abuses in the future. This, in turn, serves as an important middle step to recognizing tangible benefits, such as foreign direct investment, by improving investors’ risk perception of ratified countries.     

Is Antifa a Terrorist Group?

Starting in 2016, a number of protests and physical confrontations aimed at individuals and groups associated with right wing politics in the United States have been attributed to an ill-defined entity called “antifa”: short for anti-fascist. A high profile example took place in Charlottseville, Virginia on August 11-12, 2017. During two days of conflict and violence, anti right wing protesters clashed with right wing supporters. During the second day of the confrontation, a right-wing supporter drove a car into a crowd of protesters, killing one person and injuring 35 others. While many antifa supporters see it as a defense against right wing extremism, some on the right view supporters instead as terrorists. I tackle these issues in this essay by applying the guidelines of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to determine whether the actions by antifa supporters during the Charlottesville incident consitute terrrorism. I conclude that while the events share many characteristics of terrorist attacks, they do not include all of the elements of terrorism required by the GTD. I also question whether antifa can be considered to constitute a “group” at this point in time. My essay highlights how complicated it is to distinghish terrorism from other forms of illegal violence.     

Age and the Explanation of Crime, Revisited

Age is one of the most robust correlates of criminal behavior. Yet, explanations for this relationship are varied and conflicting. Developmental theories point to a multitude of sociological, psychological, and biological changes that occur during adolescence and adulthood. One prominent criminological perspective outlined by Gottfredson and Hirschi claims that age has a direct effect on crime, inexplicable from sociological and psychological variables. Despite the attention this claim has received, few direct empirical tests of it have been conducted. We use data from Pathways to Desistance, a longitudinal study of over 1,300 serious youthful offenders (85.8 % male, 40.1 % African-American, 34.3 % Hispanic, 21.0 % White), to test this claim. On average, youths were 16.5 years old at the initial interview and were followed for 7 years. We use multilevel longitudinal models to assess the extent to which the direct effects of age are reduced to statistical and substantive non-significance when constructs from a wide range of developmental and criminological theories are controlled. Unlike previous studies, we are able to control for changes across numerous realms emphasized within differing theoretical perspectives including social control (e.g., employment and marriage), procedural justice (e.g., perceptions of the legitimacy and fairness of the legal system), learning (e.g., gang membership and exposure to antisocial peers), strain (e.g., victimization and relationship breakup), psychosocial maturity (e.g., impulse control, self-regulation and moral disengagement), and rational choice (e.g., costs and rewards of crime). Assessed separately, these perspectives explain anywhere from 3 % (procedural justice) to 49 % (social learning) of the age-crime relationship. Together, changes in these constructs explain 69 % of the drop in crime from ages 15 to 25. We conclude that the relationship between age and crime in adolescence and early adulthood is largely explainable, though not entirely, attributable to multiple co-occurring developmental changes.     

The politics and mythology of organized crime: A Philadelphia case-study

Although much criticized, the “Cosa Nostra” theory of organized crime continues to exert considerable influence over lawmakers and law enforcement officials. This theory has been extensively studied on a national level, but few local case studies trace the transition from the multiethnic organized crime of the 1930s and 1940s to the (supposed) Italian hegemony of the years since 1960. Philadelphia provides an excellent opportunity for such a study, as the base of a strong Jewish-dominated structure before 1960 and a “Mafia town” thereafter.A major concern of this article is the manner in which the history of crime in the city was retroactively rewritten during the 1970s, in order to provide a basis for contemporary theories and bureaucratic needs.     

Aufklärung und Abwehr: The lasting legacy of the Stasi under Ernst Wollweber

The following article traces the development of East Germany's secret police, the Stasi, during the reign of Ernst Wollweber, the second Minister of State Security. By examining key Stasi operations during this period, notably the ‘concentrated strikes’ strategy following the June 1953 revolution, the campaign against Ostbüros, and operations to secure the economy, and by examining Wollweber's major speeches, it argues that Wollweber's reign was a decisive one for the Stasi because of the integration of intelligence gathering outside of East Germany (Aufklärung) with domestic surveillance (Abwehr). Although this balance shifted toward external duties in Wollweber's landmark August 1955 speech, Wollweber continued to promote integration of the two duties, in particular by anchoring the intelligence gathering duties in the local-level domestic structures of the Stasi.