Narcissistic Features in Young Adolescents: Relations to Aggression and Internalizing Symptoms

Recent research and theory suggest narcissistic features contribute to aggression in adults. The present study examined the association of narcissistic features with aggression and internalizing symptoms in 233 students of 5th–8th grade at three inner-city schools. A factor analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory in this sample revealed three factors: Adaptive Narcissism, Exploitativeness, and Exhibitionism. Regression analyses were used to predict the association of these three narcissistic features with self-, teacher-, and peer-reported aggression and self-reported internalizing symptoms. Results indicate narcissistic exploitativeness positively predicted self-reported proactive aggression, and narcissistic exhibitionism positively predicted internalizing symptoms. Narcissism and self-esteem interacted to predict teacher-reported aggression and self-reported internalizing symptoms. Results are discussed in the context of existing theories of narcissism, threatened egotism, and self-perception bias.     

Free riding with discrete and continuous public goods: Some experimental evidence

Two experimental designs were employed in which subjects were offered either a “discrete” public good, for which group contributions must meet a provision point before subjects receive payoffs; and a “continuous” public good, which returned 30 percent of group contributions to each subject at all contributions levels. Free riding, or non-contribution, is a dominant strategy in the continuous case. Non-contribution is not a dominant strategy in the discrete case; there are multiple equilibria. Contribution levels were similar in both cases, and did not vary significantly with method of payment (hypothetical versus real money); earnings, however, were higher in the continuous and realmoney versions of the experiment. Subjects' demographic characteristics made little difference to contribution patterns. The most significant determinant of contributions was the round of the “game.” Roughly speaking, subjects contributed less the longer they played, regardless of other factors.     

Committees and the core of the Constitution

An ongoing debate in the formal theory of legislatures involves the question of why these institutions (apparently) manifest so much stability. That is, why do the institutions not continually upset policies adopted only a short time before? A large number of answers have been advanced. This paper proposes that the stability derives from the interaction of two factors, (i) the fundamental constitutional rules (bicameralism, executive veto, and veto override) that structure the legislative process, and (ii) the committee systems endowed with veto powers that many American legislatures have developed. This interaction, we argue, can create a core — a set of undominated points — so large that even a substantial change in the legislature's members (reflecting electoral outcomes, for example) will be unlikely to shift its location enough for the status quo to be upset.