Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics

This article offers a revision of democratic theory in light of the experience of recently democratized countries, located outside of the northwestern quadrant of the world. First, various definitions of democracy that claim to follow Schumpeter and are usually considered to be “minimalist” or “processualist” are critically examined. Building upon but clarifying these conceptual efforts, a realistic and restricted, but not minimalist, definition of a democratic regime is proposed. Thereafter, this article argues that democracy should be analyzed not only at the level of the political regime but also in relation to the state—especially the state qua legal system—and to certain aspects of the overall social context. The main underlying theme that runs through this article is the concept of agency, especially as it is expressed in the legal system of existing democracies. I dedicate this article to my daughter Julia, for the metonymy and much love Guillermo O'Donnell is the Helen Kellogg Professor of Government at the University of Notre Dame. He has written many books and articles on authoritarianism, political transitions, democratization, and democratic theory. His latest book,Counterpoints, was published in 1998 by the University of Notre Dame Press. O'Donnell is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I presented previous versions of this paper and received useful comments at seminars held in April and May 1999 at the University of North Carolina; Cornell University; Berlin's Wissenschaftszentrum; the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August 1999; and in September 1999 at the Kellogg Institute. I also appreciate the comments and criticisms received from Michael Brie, Maxwell Cameron, Jorgen Elklit, Robert Fishman, Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Jonathan Hartlyn, Osvaldo Iazzetta, Gabriela Ippolito-O'Donnell, Iván Jaksić, Oscar Landi, Hans-Joachim Lauth, Steven Levitsky, Juan Linz, Scott Mainwaring, Juan M. Abal Medina, Martha Merritt, Peter Moody, Gerardo Munck, Luis Pásara, Timothy Power, Adam Przeworski, Héctor Schamis, Sidney Tarrow. Charles Tilly, Ashutosh Varshney, and Ruth Zimmerling. I am particularly grateful for the careful revision and editing undertaken by Gerardo Munck and Ruth Collier for the present issue ofSCID.     

阿根廷:从周期性危机走向可持续发展

尼尔森先生在参加第7届20国集团财长和央行行长会议期间,于2005年10月17日应邀到中国社会科学院拉丁美洲研究所作了演讲。尼尔森先生在演讲中着重分析了阿根廷2001年12月的危机以及从2002年第三季度至今的强劲复苏,介绍了阿根廷经济危机的原因、国际金融机构在此次危机中的作用,以及当前的债务重组战略,并对中国经济发展中增长与稳定两大特征给予了充分的肯定,对中国经济的未来以及中阿合作的前景也充满了信心。本文经作者授权在本刊发表,发表时略作了删节。     

Dynamic latent trait models: An application to Latin American banking crises

Dynamic latent trait models combine information from a variety of manifest variables, possibly measured on different scales, that are presumed to be indicators of an unobserved latent phenomenon, while allowing appropriate consideration of the longitudinal character of time series. I use a Bayesian dynamic latent trait model of banking sector financial accounts measured at the country/quarter level to build an indicator of banking system robustness in Latin America. As a methodological innovation, I extend dynamic latent trait models to take into account country-specific effects of bank regulatory regimes through hierarchical modeling of factor loadings. I suggest how these models can be applied to other types of phenomena—for example to combine existing political regime indicators to build a more informative measure of democracy.     

The value of the World Conferences on Research Integrity: perspectives from Peru

"The World Conferences on Research Integrity (WCRIs), six to date, were initiated at a time when researchers in various countries were at quite different stages in their thinking about research integrity. Over the course of the past decade, the global conferences have reflected and documented significant changes in the way research integrity is viewed and supported" [1].     

Addressing fragmented government action: coordination,coherence, and integration

Solving complex problems is a challenge faced by many governments. Academic and practical discussions on how to solve said problems look at policy integration as a solution to the negative implications that fragmented government actions have on addressing public problems or providing public services. Notwithstanding important recent contributions, we still lack a precise understanding of what policy integration is, an explanation of how it differs from other “solutions” to complex problems, such as coordination or policy coherence, and a practical operationalization. In this paper, we argue that coordination, coherence, and integration are related but substantively different concepts. We offer a new way of understanding and observing policy integration in a manner that is theoretically distinguishable from policy coordination and coherence and empirically observable. We argue that policy integration is the process of making strategic and administrative decisions aimed at solving a complex problem. Solving this complex problem is a goal that encompasses—but exceeds—the programs’ and agencies’ individual goals. In practical terms, it means that, at every moment of the policy process, there is a decision-making body making decisions based on a new logic—that of addressing a complex problem.     

Vote-seeking incentives and investment environments: The need for credit claiming and the provision of protectionism

Incentives to cultivate a personal reputation encourage legislators to generate policy outcomes for which they can claim credit. We show that these incentives make themselves felt in international agreements – a domain that might typically be considered within the purview of the executive branch. Through a cross-national analysis and brief case studies, we show that countries with electoral systems that encourage personal vote seeking are more likely to negotiate exceptions to treaties meant to liberalize their investment environments. Legislators benefit by being able to claim credit for having protected their constituents from the competition an unrestricted agreement would entail.     

Cultural aspects in the integration of the Americas

This paper discusses cultural issues that may contribute to the success or failure of trade agreements in the Americas. We use the case of Mexico and the USA to illustrate the point, though the cultural issues are also an important factor in agreements between Latin American nations. The main contention of the paper is that the more there is a push for economic and financial integration the more there is a risk of cultural fragmentation unless the cultural misunderstandings between nations are worked out properly. Managing cultural integration successfully requires a process of “intercultural learning”.