Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law

The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law.     

Punishment and Security

Policymakers and the public widely believe that punishment can reduce crime and therefore improve security. Empirical data, however, prove the preventive effect of punishment to be very limited at best. Especially, the assumption that imposing longer sentences will reduce crime rates seems erroneous. In our opinion, this misconception is due to a confusion of time perspectives: Criminal law necessarily looks back to the past, as it reacts to a deed. Security, on the other hand, means preventing dangers, and its focus must be the future. Hence, time orientation of criminal law and the logic of protection clash. Criminal law cannot provide the security wished for. The same mistake is repeated in the prevalent theories of punishment, notably the relative or unified theories of punishment. Security cannot be achieved or fostered through harsher punishment or punishment threats. On the other hand, one means of decreasing crime is increasing the number of policemen.     

Two Objections to Yaffe on the Criminalization of Attempts

In his recent book Attempts, Gideon Yaffe suggests that attempts should be criminalized because of a principle he dubs the “Transfer Principle.” This principle holds that if a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized. Although Yaffe provides a powerful defense of the Transfer Principle, in this paper I argue that Yaffe’s argument for it ultimately does not succeed. In particular, I formulate two objections to Yaffe’s argument for the Transfer Principle. First, I argue that a basic assumption about criminalization, on which Yaffe’s argument crucially depends, is incomplete, and Yaffe’s own attempt to supplement it undermines his argument for the Transfer Principle. Second, I argue that Yaffe’s argument does not properly account for the fact that those who merely attempt a crime and those who complete it might sometimes be responding to reasons in different ways. Accordingly, I conclude that Yaffe has not succeeded in establishing the truth of the Transfer Principle.     

From Workers to Migrants,from Distributive Justice to Inclusion: Exploring the Changing Social Democratic Imagination

There is little awareness that from the perspective of distributive justice, a transnational market society exercises a justice‐disabling effect. No longer is society perceived to be a system of co‐operation, the net product of which is to be distributed among all participants fairly, but rather viewed as a composite of uncoordinated templates for the individual pursuit of opportunities. A society of this type does no longer regard a centralised political effort at redistribution as its essential objective; rather, its most fundamental principle concerns equal access to opportunities without regard to nationality or local preference. Such a concern with inclusion appears to be at odds with the received vision of distributive justice whose realisation presupposes bounded solidarity and, hence, closure.