Toward Judicial Comity: Certification in the Courts

Certification is a procedure whereby federal courts may askstate courts of last resort to clarify an ambiguous provisionof state law. This increasingly popular device of deferenceoperates as an alternative to abstention and to the casual predictionof the meaning of state law. Certification is a permissive anddiscretionary mechanism; as such, it is neither universal inits usage nor uniform in its application. The thirty-eight statesthat authorize the procedure differ on which federal courtsmay participate and whether the answer to the certified questionmust determine, or resolve, the lawsuit. Our survey resultsindicate that federal and state judges alike praise certificationfor its contributions to intersystem harmony. It conserves judicialresources, advances litigant interests, minimizes interpretivemisguesses, and avoids repetitive litigation.     

Structure and Process in Federal and Consociational Arrangements

Daniel J. Elazar uses the concepts of structure and processto distinguish between federal and consociational arrangements.While the distinction is appropriate and useful, it does havelimitations, and in some respects may be slightly misleading.It is argued here that under certain circumstances, politicalstructures can play an important role in defining or promotingcon-sociational arrangements, even if such structures were originallythe result of social forces. An additional point made is thatin both federations and consociations, the relationship betweenstructure and process is essentially reciprocal. It is suggestedthat more attention be paid to the differences in the kindsof structures found in the two forms of governance and, in turn,how they might be linked to differences in process. At thisstage, it appears that consociations are much more confederalin form, which has certain consequences for the manner in whichconflict is both structured and resolved.     

Second-order elections

Abstract The composition of the directly elected European Parliament does not precisely reflect the 'real' balance of political forces in the European Community. As long as the national political systems decide most of what there is to be decided politically, and everything really important, European elections are additional national second-order elections. They are determined more by the domestic political cleavages than by alternatives originating in the EC, but in a different way than if nine first-order national elections took place simultaneously. This is the case because European elections occur at different stages of the national political systems' respective 'electoral cycles'. Such a relationship between a second-order arena and the chief arena of a political system is not at all unusual. What is new here, is that one second-order political arena is related to nine different first-order arenas. A first analysis of European election results satisfactorily justifies the assumption mat European Parliament direct elections should be treated as nine simultaneous national second-order elections.     

Consolidating cabinet portfolios: Australian lessons for Canada

Abstract: The June 1993 reorganization of the Canadian cabinet undertaken by Prime Minister Kim Campbell is the latest manifestation of a theme in vogue: the consolidation of ministerial portfolios in order to reduce the size of cabinet. This paper examines the recent Canadian changes in light of the Australian cabinet reorganization of 1987, which saw twenty-eight cabinet portfolios reduced to sixteen. The Australian experience with a consolidated cabinet is assessed from four perspectives: political control; policy interdependence and coordination; efficiency and cost savings; and budgetary discipline. We argue that in many ways the focus on cabinet size per se is misleading. The significant questions relate to the organization of authority within cabinet and the relationships between individuals assigned executive authority rather than the actual number of minister. The June 1993 Canadian reorganization emulates the Australian model in most respects, although the issue of effective political control may well depend on an expanded role for parliamentary secretaries in lieu of junior ministers. Sommaire: La réorganisation du Conseil des ministres du Canada, entreprise par le Premier ministre Kim Campbell en juin 1993, est la toute dernière manifestation d'un thème actuellement à la mode: la consolidation des postes ministériels afin de réduire la taille du Conseil des ministres. Dans cet article, on analyse les modifications récentes survenues au Canada à la lumière de la réorganisation du Conseil des ministres de l'Australie en 1987, oú le nombre des postes de ministres a été réduit de 28 à 16. L'expérience de l'Australie avec un Conseil des ministres consolidé est évaluée à partir de quatre points de vue:contrôle politique; interdépendance et coordination des politiques; efficacité et économie de coût, et enfin, discipline budgétaire. À notre avis, l'accent mis sur la taille du Conseil des ministres est, sous de nombreux aspects, mal placé. Les questions importantes ont trait à l'organisation de l'autorité au sein du Conseil des ministres ainsi qu'aux relations entre les personnes ayant reçu une autorité exécutive, plutôt qu'au nombre effectif de ministres. La réorganisation canadienne de juin 1993 imite le modèle australien sous la plupart des aspects, bien que sur la question du contrôle politique effectif, elle semble accorder un rôle plus important aux secrétaires parlementaires plutôt qu'aux ministres de second rang.     

An Analysis of Differences in Work Motivation between Public and Private Sector Organizations

This study contributes to our understanding of the differences in work motivation between the public and private sectors. Data from a survey of 3,314 private sector and 409 public sector employees in Belgium strongly confirm previous research showing that public sector employees are less extrinsically motivated. Differences in hierarchical level are more important determinants of work motivation than sectoral differences. In addition, most observed differences can be wholly or partially explained by differences in job content, not by the sector itself. Evidence is presented to show that motivational differences can be explained by a positive choice of work–life balance.