75.
ABSTRACTIndia and Pakistan have tempered their rivalry over the years by negotiating many bilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs), but the current patchwork of agreements cannot prevent an act of cross-border terrorism from triggering a major militarised crisis. To help mitigate this shortfall, this article advocates a new conceptual approach towards confidence building that identifies two categories of agreements – negative and positive. Negative CBMs oblige
inaction; they can be defined as promises to eschew provocative behaviour, so as to prevent miscalculation and accidental war. Most prominent Indo-Pakistani CBMs fall under this category – examples include agreements on non-attack of nuclear facilities and non-violation of airspace. Positive CBMs, by contrast, oblige
action; they entail tangible engagement and cooperation in the military, diplomatic, or economic domains. Examples might include counter-piracy cooperation and the expansion of people-to-people contacts. This article argues that positive CBMs invite reciprocity and are a plausible tool for promoting bilateral goodwill, reducing mistrust, and insulating Indo-Pakistani relations from shocks.
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