THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPARABLE WORTH IN IOWA

This research describes and analyzes the implementation of comparable worth legislation in Iowa and focuses on two aspects of the issue: implementatlon of the job evaluation study mandated by the law, and implementation of the classification and compensation systems which resulted from the study. The paper argues that the General Assembly involved itself too directly and too long in the implementation process which led to confrontation with the executive branch and numerous problems in the implementation of comparable worth legislation.     

Insanity plea: Relationship to victim and defendents

Conclusion The results of this analogue study clearly indicate that subjects' attitudes toward defendants, as measured by the type of disposition selected are influenced by their relationship to either the victim or the defendant with the most liberal alternatives occurring when the defendant is a relative and the most harsh alternatives chose when the victim of the crime is a relative. Although the present study was concermed with the insanity plea, it seems probables that similar findings might also transpire when other controversial matters in the criminal justice system as investigated, such as probation, parole, and mandatory jail sentences for persons convicted of driving under the influence.     

Seeking justice: The advantages and disadvantages of being educated

Criminal justice needs to be examined and developed in the larger context of social justice. Social ills such as pervasive individual and corporate greed and evasiveness need to be addressed as we attempt to promote a greater sense of social peace. Such an effort involves teaching meaningful social values in both general education settings as well as in the particular discipline of criminal justice.     

Learning and Change in 20th-Century British Economic Policy

Despite considerable interest in the means by which policy learning occurs, and in how it is that the framework of policy may be subject to radical change, the "black box" of economic policy making remains surprisingly murky. This article utilizes Peter Hall's concept of "social learning" to develop a more sophisticated model of policy learning; one in which paradigm failure does not necessarily lead to wholesale paradigm replacement, and in which an administrative battle of ideas may be just as important a determinant of paradigm change as a political struggle. It then applies this model in a survey of U.K. economic policy making since the 1930s: examining the shift to "Keynesianism" during the 1930s and 1940s; the substantial revision of this framework in the 1960s; the collapse of the "Keynesian-plus" framework in the 1970s; and the major revisions to the new "neoliberal" policy framework in the 1980s and 1990s.     

'Moves on a Chess Board': A Spatial Model of British Prime Ministers' Powers over Cabinet Formation

We use an institutional rational choice approach to help us understand how prime ministers in the UK make cabinet appointments and the implications for prime ministerial power. Assuming that prime ministers attempt to form a cabinet so as to get an overall package of policies as close as possible to their ideal, we show why the trade-offs they face are so complex, why apparently common-sense rules for making appointments might not always work well and why apparently strange choices made by prime ministers might actually be rational. Acknowledging the power prime ministers derive from their ability to appoint, we argue that the literature commonly fails to distinguish between power and luck, where lucky prime ministers get their way because they happen to agree with colleagues.     

Is Rule by Majorities Special?

One way of making decisions is for political associates or their representatives to vote on each issue separately in accordance with the majority principle and then take the cumulative outcomes of such majority decision making to define the collective choice for public policy. We call such a system one of majorities rule. Thought of in spatial terms, majorities rule is equivalent to the principle of making decisions according to the issue-by-issue median of voter preferences. If popular control and political equality are core democratic values, they can be rendered as requirements on a collective choice rule, involving resoluteness, anonymity, strategy-proofness and responsiveness. These requirements entail that the collective decision rule be a percentile method. If we then add a requirement of impartiality, as exhibited in a collective choice rule which would be chosen behind a veil of ignorance, then the issue-by-issue median is uniquely identified as a fair rule. Hence, majorities rule is special. Some objections to this line of reasoning are considered.     

Y. Shany,Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts,Oxford University Press,Oxford, 2014, xix + 322 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-964329-5.

Netherlands International Law Review -     

Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty

We analyze the impact of public commitment strategies as bargaining tools in the negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty using a sequential-bargaining model with incomplete information. The analysis suggests selection bias in observable public commitments with respect to the kind of issues that are publicly challenged as well as the kind of governments that will ‘go public’. Public commitments are more likely under high uncertainty over audience costs. Further, the effect of public commitments on the duration and outcome of negotiation is conditional as well. In our empirical analysis, where we analyze the intergovernmental stage of the negotiations on the European Constitutional Treaty, we find strong empirical support for each of our theoretical predictions. Governments were most likely to commit publicly if they represented a domestic constituency that was negative about the EU Constitution and, at the same time, contained many undecided respondents. Moreover, these public commitments were generally quickly accommodated. In contrast, public commitments were less likely to lead to any changes if they were made by governments representing a domestic constituency that was relatively positive about the draft Constitution or negative and decided. In the latter case, however, public statements made bargaining deadlock more likely.

科斯定理在侵权法制定中的应用

科斯定理认为 ,交易成本的高低对权利规则的制定起着决定性作用。如果交易成本较低 ,权利的原始配置就不会影响太大 ,因为当事人会自行重置 ;但在交易成本较高的情况下 ,一般会保持权利的原始配置状态。科斯定理不仅是经济学原理 ,在侵权法领域也大有作为。