Vertrag über Stabilit?t, Koordinierung und Steuerung in der WWU und Europ?ischer Stabilit?tsmechanismus

Anfang Februar 2012 unterzeichneten die 17 Euro-Staaten den Vertrag über die Einrichtung eines permanenten Europ?ischen Stabilit?tsmechanismus ("ESM-Vertrag"). Einen Monat sp?ter wurde von 25 der 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten der Vertrag über Stabilit?t, Koordinierung und Steuerung in der Wirtschafts- und W?hrungsunion ("VSKS") zum Abschluss gebracht. Beide Vertr?ge sind Teil des Krisenbew?ltigungsprogramms in der Union, stehen aber au?erhalb des EU-Vertragswerks. Aufgrund der Ausgestaltung als rein zwischenstaatliche Vereinbarungen werfen die beiden Vertr?ge hinsichtlich ihres Verh?ltnisses zu und ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit dem Recht der Europ?ischen Union einige interessante Fragen auf, die der vorliegende Beitrag n?her untersuchen will.     

Insider-controlled Firms in Russia

Privatisation Vouchers in Russia were heavily invested in the holders' own firms. Using data from a recent survey, we show that insider control in firms privatised in 1992-4 through the voucher process (as distinct from the earlier leased buy-out method) is insecure and dependent on managers' support. For employees, investment in insider control appears to have been motivated by employment income insurance rather than expected excess returns on the equity. Managers are predominantly the same individuals as before privatisation and display considerable hostility to outside investors, probably because they fear dismissal should outsiders gain control. Despite insider control, firms are shedding labour quite rapidly through voluntary resignations. Employment dynamics appear to be unrelated to insider equity ownership.     

On the Efficiency of By-Product Lobbying

To explain the existence of large lobbying groups, Olsonproposes a `by-product theory': large lobbies are by-productsof industry associations that operate as monopolists inprivate goods markets. This paper explicitly formulatesOlson's by-product theory of lobby funding and examines itsefficiency as a funding method. Lobbying efficiency isenhanced by the association's ability to price-discriminate.Price discrimination, in turn, is facilitated by theassociation's superior knowledge of its members'characteristics. The paper also examines the relationshipbetween lobby strength and industry size, as well as thequestion of `who exploits whom' under by-product lobbying.     

Review essay / murder is different

Hugo Adam Bedau, Death is Different: Studies in the Morality, Law, and Politics of Capital Punishment Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987; xii, 307pp.