An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies

A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self-regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non-enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self-regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory.     

Developing Options for the Administration of Local Taxes: An International Review*

Do decentralization arguments extend to administration of subnational taxes? While centralized administration promises quality service at reasonable cost, it may dull accountability and slow the revenue flow. Also, central administration may devote less attention to collecting these taxes than for its own. Self‐administration brings administration closer to taxpayers and assures representation of jurisdictional interests in revenue apportionment disputes. However, subnational governments may lack technical capacity. That is the dilemma: while the central administration may be indifferent to rigorous collection of subnational taxes, subnational governments may lack capacity for self‐administration. In practice, nations use many different alternatives for administering subnational taxes.     

CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE DYNAMICS OF TRIADIC RELATIONSHIPS

The accession of the UK into the European Community in 1973 and the growth in power and competence of European institutions in subsequent years prompts a rethink of relationships between central and local governance. Rather than a dyadic process between two sets of bodies, the new triadic system is based on varying interactions between the three groups of actors at each level. The article develops six possible scenarios of new relationships which can be simplified into centralization, no change or decentralization. To appraise the nature of the changes, the article examines the operation of the European Regional Development Fund, the additionality controversy, lobbying over the 1994 reform of the structural funds and aspects of environmental regulation. Rather than one scenario dominating, the findings show several types of new relationships emerging.     

TOWARDS A BETTER PUBLIC LAW?

In the UK Constitution, the major weapon of judicial control over the exercise of governmental power is provided by the action for judicial review. This action serves to keep public bodies within the scope of the powers conferred on them by law. Prior to the present Law Commission inquiry into procedural aspects of judicial review, the matter was last examined in 1977 since when there have been significant changes in the ways in which governmental power is exercised and controlled. This article takes as its focus the Law Commission's Report No.226 Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals and examines specific proposals contained therein arguing that, underlying the reforms, there exists no coherent vision of the future role of public law. Instead, what is revealed is a confused cocktail of measures in which the tension between the legitimate needs of public administration and the opposing requirement that government act according to law remains unacknowledged and thereby unresolved. There is, moreover, a disappointing failure to evaluate the experience of public law procedures found in other jurisdictions. In response to these perceived deficiencies, the authors set out an alternative and principled account of judicial review, the central feature of which is to ensure that public power is subjected to an appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny. This alternative account is later used to inform arguments about specific reforms. In this regard, the valuable experience of other jurisdictions'public law procedures is also drawn upon.