Research Note: Libertarian-authoritarian Value Change in Britain, 1974–2001

This research note explores the mechanisms behind age differences and changes over time in one of the two major value dimensions in British politics, libertarian-authoritarianism. I show that the British electorate has become substantially more libertarian over the last 30 years, but that older people have remained more authoritarian than younger people over this period. Conventionally, due to the problem of the under-identification of models containing age, period and cohort variables, it is difficult to assess whether this indicates generational differences, and generational change, or not. This paper overcomes some of these problems however, by measuring social ageing factors, such as marriage, and using panel data to rigorously assess how individuals change due to these social ageing factors. I find little evidence of psychologists' claims that social ageing leads to increases in authoritarianism, and conclude that both age differences and changes over time are generational in nature.     

A Framework for Assessing Incentives in Results-Based Management

Many governmental results-based management systems have not produced the expected positive effects. This article analyzes the reasons for this common disappointment by looking at three components of results-based management—results-specific information, capacities, and incentives—and concludes that incentives are often the least developed. It then synthesizes a simple framework for evaluating the efficacy of results-oriented incentives. To be successful, results-specific incentives must be tailored to fit four program characteristics: timeliness, political environment, clarity of the cause-and-effect chain, and tightness of focus. This framework suggests that some systems put too exclusive an emphasis on budgetary incentives and could be strengthened by emphasizing personnel-system rewards, especially those that look beyond business models.     

Money,Mortgages, and the Conquest of America

In colonial America, land acquired new liquidity when it became liable for debts. Though English property law maintained a firm distinction between land and chattel for centuries, in the American colonies, the boundary between the categories of real and personal property began to disintegrate. There, the novelty of easy foreclosure and consequent easy alienation of land made it possible for colonists to obtain credit, using land as a security. However, scholars have neglected the first instances in which a newly unconstrained practice of mortgage foreclosure appeared—the transactions through which colonists acquired land from indigenous people in the first place. In this article, I explore these early transactions for land, which took place across fundamental differences between colonists’ and native communities’ conceptions of money, land, and exchange itself. I describe how difference and dependence propelled the growth of the early American contact economy to make land into real estate, or the fungible commodity on the speculative market that it remains today.