The power of international criminal courts: Strategic behavior and accountability networks

International criminal courts are often given mandates without the authority or resources to enforce those directives. Given this, how do they achieve their objectives? We argue that in the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the court strategically developed an accountability network comprised of governmental and nongovernmental actors, using its expertise and position to provide information and a framework of accountability. Simultaneously, it reached out to a range of actors to ensure that governments and international organizations would push Balkan states to cooperate with the ICTY, thereby amplifying the court's power. Utilizing correspondence data, we create a unique dataset that traces the development of this accountability network, demonstrating how this institution engaged networks to pursue its goals. In general, we demonstrate that, although institutions may lack compulsory power, they can engage in strategic behavior using networks to project their productive power.     

The ideological nationalization of partisan subconstituencies in the American States

Since the mid-twentieth century, elite political behavior in the United States has become much more nationalized. In Congress, for example, within-party geographic cleavages have declined, roll-call voting has become more one-dimensional, and Democrats and Republicans have diverged along this main dimension of national partisan conflict. The existing literature finds that citizens have only weakly and belatedly mimicked elite trends. We show, however, that a different picture emerges if we focus not on individual citizens, but on the aggregate characteristics of geographic constituencies. Using biennial estimates of the economic, racial, and social policy liberalism of the average Democrat and Republican in each state over the past six decades, we demonstrate a surprisingly close correspondence between mass and elite trends. Specifically, we find that: (1) ideological divergence between Democrats and Republicans has widened dramatically within each domain, just as it has in Congress; (2) ideological variation across senators’ partisan subconstituencies is now explained almost completely by party rather than state, closely tracking trends in the Senate; and (3) economic, racial, and social liberalism have become highly correlated across partisan subconstituencies, just as they have across members of Congress. Overall, our findings contradict the reigning consensus that polarization in Congress has proceeded much more rapidly and extensively than polarization in the mass public.     

No Need to Watch: How the Effects of Partisan Media Can Spread via Interpersonal Discussions

To what extent do partisan media sources shape public opinion? On its face, it would appear that the impact of partisan media is limited, given that it attracts a relatively small audience. We argue, however, that its influence may extend beyond its direct audience via a two‐step communication flow. Specifically, those who watch and are impacted by partisan media outlets talk to and persuade others who did not watch. We present experimental results that demonstrate this process. We therefore show that previous studies may have significantly underestimated the effect of these outlets. We also illustrate that how the two‐step communication flow works is contingent upon the precise composition of the discussion group (e.g., is it consistent of all fellow partisans or a mix of partisans?). We conclude by highlighting what our results imply about the study of media, preference formation, and partisan polarization.     

Why do South-east Asian states choose to suppress opium? A cross-case comparison

Abstract

This paper compares the reasons given by three South-east Asian states (Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) for choosing to suppress opium production. While external pressure, often from the US or United Nations (UN)/League of Nations, is the most commonly identified reason in the literature, and was experienced in each case, it was not by itself sufficient to motivate states into action. All three cases were motivated by religious or ideological opposition to drug consumption or trade, rural development, state extension and concern for increasing domestic drug consumption. Apprehension about rising drug consumption often possessed racial or chauvinistic elements. The development of export commodities, environmental protection and national security were also identified in one or two cases. The paper concludes by hypothesising that economic and/or security considerations underlie all choices to suppress illicit drug crops.     

The non-governmental provision of search and rescue in the Mediterranean and the abdication of state responsibility

From January 2015 to December 2017, approximately 1.6 million migrants crossed the Mediterranean to reach Europe. The death toll was dramatic, with almost 15,000 drowning. In response to the void left by the ending of the Italian-led Mare Nostrum mission, several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) launched their own search and rescue (SAR) operations, rescuing over 110,000 migrants. In this article, we argue that states have the responsibility not only to coordinate, but also to directly provide adequate SAR operations in the Mediterranean, and that these responsibilities are presently being abdicated. Although much criticism of NGO maritime rescuing operations is misplaced, non-governmental SAR has notable limitations, and states are ultimately responsible for this shortfall.     

Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions Are Not Synonymous: How to Place the Key Disjuncture Between Attitudes and Behaviors at the Heart of Our Research into Political Violence

This article develops and elaborates on three core points. First, as with research into other social science themes, it is argued that it is necessary to apply the logic of correlation and causality to the study of political violence. Second, it highlights the critical disjuncture between attitudes and behaviors. Many or most individuals who support the use of political violence remain on the sidelines, including those who sympathize with insurgents in Afghanistan (reportedly 29 percent in 2011), and those supportive of “suicide attacks” in the Palestinian Territories (reportedly reaching 66 percent in 2005). Conversely, those responsible for such behaviors are not necessarily supportive of the ostensible political aims. Third, it is argued that the motives that drive these attitudes and behaviors are often (or, some would argue, always) distinct. While the former are motivated by collective grievances, there is substantial case study evidence that the latter are commonly driven by economic (e.g., payments for the emplacement of improvised explosive devices), security-based (i.e., coercion) and sociopsychological (e.g., adventure, status, and vengeance) incentives. Thus, it is necessary for the research community to treat attitudes and behaviors as two separate, albeit interrelated, lines of inquiry.     

Associations Between Fifth Graders’ Gender Atypical Problem Behavior and Peer Relationships: A Short-Term Longitudinal Study

An accruing body of evidence supports associations between self-perceived gender typicality and peer relationship difficulties; however, researchers have yet to evaluate peers' perceptions of problem behaviors to gain insight into the social correlates of gender typicality. A short-term longitudinal study was conducted to evaluate associations between gender atypical problem behavior and subsequent peer relational difficulties for 2,076 fifth graders (M age= 10.27; 53% female). Peer nomination methodology was used to assess participants' classroom peer relationships, problem behaviors, and social-emotional characteristics. Findings showed that youth characterized by gender atypical, compared to gender typical, problem behavior (withdrawn boys/aggressive girls vs. withdrawn girls/aggressive boys, respectively) evidenced higher levels of subsequent peer difficulties; moreover, participation in a mutual friendship was associated with decreased risk for peer relationship maladjustment, particularly among youth characterized by gender atypical problem behavior. Results further revealed that, compared to friendless youth, friended youth earned higher prosocial and peer liking scores and, for withdrawn youth, lower emotional sensitivity scores. The present research contributes to our understanding of the potential short-term consequences of youth's gender atypical problem behavior. Findings underscore the need for supplemental conceptualizations of gender typicality as well as multifaceted interventions designed to promote the acceptance of gender nonnormativity, support the development of adaptive peer relationships, and reduce the occurrence of problem behaviors.     

Power and property: commercialization,enclosures, and the transformation of agrarian relations in Ethiopia

The transnational agrarian social movement Vía Campesina is campaigning to have the United Nations negotiate and implement a Declaration, and eventually an International Convention, on Peasants' Rights. This article analyzes the origins and demands of the campaign and the place of the claimed rights in international law. Peasant organizations hope to follow in the footsteps of indigenous peoples' movements that participated in the negotiations preceding the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The peasants' rights campaign has succeeded in linking its demands to discussions of the right to food in the United Nations, where concern is growing over the approach of the 2015 target for realizing the Millennium Development Goals, in particular the halving of the numbers of people suffering from hunger. The campaign is likely to face stiff resistance from powerful UN member states, but could achieve substantial advances even if the path to a convention is difficult or never completed.     

Ethnicity,Islam, and Pakistani Public Opinion toward the Pakistani Taliban

This article argues that an Islamist militant group with a relatively homogenous ethnic make-up is more likely to be supported by those of the same ethnicity even if the group makes no reference to and even downplays the importance of ethnicity. Using survey data from an original survey carried out in Pakistan in 2013, with 7,656 respondents, this hypothesis is tested in a multiple regression analysis of support for the Pakistani Taliban. The results demonstrate that co-ethnicity between the respondent and the Islamist militant group is the most important predictor of support for the militant group.