Complex Individualism and Legitimacy of Absolute Property Rights

In this article my purpose is to go thoroughly into the ideas expressed by economists regarding the legitimacy of absolute property rights. I visit the Lockian argument taken up by Murray Rothbard (1.1) and the principle of the finder keeper clarified by Israel Kizner (1.2). I argue that it is impossible to legitimate either the property of the finder keeper or the property of oneself if man does not think of himself as an individual. Indeed individualism becomes the cultural prerequisite required to acknowledge the rights of the finder keeper and the goods obtained through labour. Here, Hayek's complex individualism is akin to the hypothesis of the social animal of Benjamin Constant and the work of Gabriel Tarde on the transformation of law. The individual is both an effect and a cause of property rights.     

Bringing Horses to Water? Overcoming Bad Relationships in the Pre-Negotiating Stage of Consensus Building

This article uses a case-study methodology to explore the impact of problematic relationships on the initiation of consensus-building efforts. The article notes that poor relations hinder the initiation process, while the expectation of benefits likely to result from the effort fosters the involvement of parties. The association between poor relations and expected benefits is explored with a focus on the appeal of collaboration. Strategies are then outlined to help facilitators to deal with problematic relationships by mitigating poor relations, highlighting incentives for participation, and building on the appeal of collaboration. Facilitators can use these strategies to increase their chances of success in initiating consensus-building efforts.     

ADMINISTRATIVE CHRONICLE VICTORIA*

In its final months the outgoing Thompson Liberal Ministry was largely pre-occupied with the implementation of its New Directions strategy. It introduced a public service bill in December to bring about greater effectiveness in the public service and ensure that its policy priorities were understood, thus complementing the Effectiveness Review Committee already set up, and it began a review of the three central coordinating agencies, the Public Service Board, the Treasury and the Department of the Premier, with an independent American consultant. The thrust of these three measures was to advise the government on proposals to set up new departments, relocate personnel and manpower resources, to set up programs for effectiveness reviews, and to bring forward amendments to the Public Service Act of 1974 which had followed Sir Henry Bland's inquiry in the early 1970s. These were intended to give the Public Service Board extended powers to allow it to conduct effectiveness reviews into statutory authorities, to extend Board employment powers to such authorities and to bring them into the public service framework, ensuring a more cohesive and less fragmented State public service. Senior staff could now be employed on term appointments, with performance-oriented objectives, giving greater flexibility at the top. And finally, the Board was to have power to become involved in specific industrial issues at the departmental level, sharpening its current generalized industrial powers.