The U.S. and third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations

Although scholars focused on Soviet–American relations during the Cold War, the greatest number of conflicts for the U.S. occurred in the Third World, and most of these were with revolutionary states. Could U.S. policies toward the new revolutionary states have prevented the almost universal collapse in relations? Two dominant explanations for this breakdown are (1) American hostility toward revolutionary change and (2) Stephen Walt's variant of the spiral model. Using the comparative case approach and selecting "hard cases," this article disputes these explanations and offers a new theory based on the externalization of domestic conflict in the revolutionary states. Given their ideological goals, the radicals externalized their domestic conflicts with the moderates, who had transnational ties with the U.S., by fomenting tensions with Washington. To demonstrate that this theory can be generalized, this article varies the dependent variable and shows through a critical case that its lack of conflict can best be explained by the absence of the conditions that lead to externalization. The foreign policies of both the U.S. and revolutionary states are explained by classical realism as opposed to Walt's structural realism, which fails to account for the foreign policies of Third World states.     

Further Tests of the Women and Peace Hypothesis: Evidence from Cross-National Survey Research in the Middle East

This research report replicates, extends, and adds a longitudinal dimension to a recently published analysis focusing on the relationship between sex and attitudes toward international conflict, and specifically on the hypothesis that women are more peace-oriented than men. The study being replicated utilized public opinion data from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait. The present report extends the analysis, employing one additional data set from Israel, two additional data sets from Palestine, and new data sets from Jordan and Lebanon. In contrast to findings from studies conducted in the United States and Europe, none of the nine Middle Eastern data sets yields a statistically significant relationship between sex and attitudes toward international conflict. The article considers possible reasons for the difference between findings from the Middle East and those based on research in the West. Emphasizing the notion of salience, it hypothesizes that characteristics of the conflict about which attitudes are held may be more important than country or regional attributes in determining the applicability of the women and peace hypothesis.