¡Que se Vayan Todos! Popular Insurrection and the Asambleas Barriales in Argentina

In December 2001, Argentina experienced a decisive crisis. A financial collapse accelerated by the massive flight of capital and the IMF denial of a new loan was followed by a popular insurrection which, by putting forward the slogan ¡ que se vayan todos, que no quede ni uno solo ! forced the resignation of national authorities. Whilst Duhalde's provisional government is negotiating the conditions for international financial support, faced with inflation and the rise of the dollar exchange rate, social mobilisation is expanding in new forms. This paper argues that the popular insurrection of December 2001 opened a space for the reinvention of the political as negative politics, the asambleas barriales constituting one example of this.     

Influence of electricity on post-mortal body temperature

In a case of suicidal application of electricity differences between the rectal temperature of the body and the suspected time of death were observed.In order to answer the question whether an electric current from hand to hand over >30 min led to a rise in body temperature FEM-based computer simulations and animal experiments were carried out. Both resulted in a warming of the soft parts in the arm without warming the body core. Thus a temperature-based estimation of the time since death can also be used in cases with electricity as the cause of death. Besides, in the animal experiment we found a spontaneous rise in the body core temperature even without application of electricity which may be a reason for the typical temperature plateau after death.     

Can information change public opinion? Another test of the Marshall hypotheses

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall offered his opinion regarding the utility of public opinion polls as a tool for assessing the “evolving standards of decency” regarding capital punishment. His arguments became known as the Marshall hypotheses and spawned a considerable body of empirical testing. The three Marshall hypotheses are: (1) support for capital punishment is inversely associated with knowledge about it, (2) exposure to information about capital punishment produces sentiments in opposition to capital punishment, but (3) exposure to information about capital punishment will have no impact on those who support it for retributive reasons. The results of previous tests of these hypotheses were somewhat mixed but supportive. None of these studies, however, examined the effects of change in knowledge levels with changes, if any, in death penalty attitudes and beliefs as needed for a more complete test of the Marshall hypotheses. The present study addressed this shortcoming. The results provided mixed support for these three hypotheses. That is, death penalty supporters were somewhat less informed than death penalty opponents; exposure to death penalty information and knowledge gains tended to be associated with attitudinal change in a directions suggested by these hypotheses; but, retributivists' attitudes toward and beliefs about capital punishment were not any more resistant to change than were the attitudes and beliefs of non-retributivists.     

The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Protection: The Case of Software

The end of the twentieth century was marked by a sea change in global governance in the realm of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Whereas countries historically retained substantial autonomy with regard to what they defined as intellectual "property" and the rights granted to the owners of intellectual property, the 1990s witnessed the establishment of new global obligations regarding national practices. This paper focuses on the case of software "piracy" to assess the mechanisms by which the new global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are transmitted from the international to the national levels. We first consider a set of national-level factors that many scholars have shown to be important determinants of IPR policy. We then supplement the standard emphasis on domestic factors with an analysis of new transnational factors: countries' multilateral obligations under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and bilateral pressures from the United States to increase the protection of IPRs. Population-averaged panel data models are used to assess the effects of these national and transnational determinants on levels of software piracy in 80 countries from 1994 to 2002. Our results indicate that membership in the WTO and bilateral pressures from the United States—particularly pressures that offer reciprocal concessions—lead to substantial increases in levels of protection in rich and poor countries. There is, in short, a new international political economy of intellectual property.