National Human Rights Institutions: Domestic implementation of international human rights law

Does adopting a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) make states’ international commitments to not torture more constraining? Many researchers have explored international human rights treaties’ abilities to constrain leaders from violating human rights, some focusing exclusively on the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Thus far, findings are not promising unless certain domestic conditions apply such as sufficient democratic space to air grievances or independent judiciaries. This article continues to explore domestic conditions by focusing on another liberal institution—National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). Torture is usually a secretive practice, and NHRIs act as information providers to potential mobilizers and domestic legal systems assuring international legal commitments are not empty promises. Using statistical analysis on 153 countries over the years 1981–2007, I find that when a country has ratified the CAT, the presence of an NHRI substantively decreases the chances the state will be an egregious offender.     

What the Demolition of Public Housing Teaches Us about the Impact of Racial Threat on Political Behavior

How does the context in which a person lives affect his or her political behavior? I exploit an event in which demographic context was exogenously changed, leading to a significant change in voters' behavior and demonstrating that voters react strongly to changes in an outgroup population. Between 2000 and 2004, the reconstruction of public housing in Chicago caused the displacement of over 25,000 African Americans, many of whom had previously lived in close proximity to white voters. After the removal of their African American neighbors, the white voters' turnout dropped by over 10 percentage points. Consistent with psychological theories of racial threat, their change in behavior was a function of the size and proximity of the outgroup population. Proximity was also related to increased voting for conservative candidates. These findings strongly suggest that racial threat occurs because of attitude change rather than selection.     

Polish ‘Temporary’ Migration: The Formation and Significance of Social Networks

This article is based on in-depth interviews with migrants in different locations in Poland and the UK and explores Polish migrant decision making in both countries. In particular, we ask how migrants build networks, how this influences their decisions about the duration of their stay abroad, and the implications of network building for community cohesion. Networks exist within the sending country; between the sending and the receiving country; within diasporas; and between diasporas and the receiving community. Our article considers the first three sections of this chain.     

THE TRUANCY COURT DIVERSION PROGRAM OF THE FAMILY COURT,WARREN CIRCUIT COURT DIVISION III,BOWLING GREEN,KENTUCKY: AN EVALUATION OF IMPACT ON ATTENDANCE AND ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE

Educators, parents, and community services partnered with the family court judge to implement the Truancy Court Diversion Program (TCDP). TCDP significantly impacted unexcused absences, unexcused tardies, and academic performance of the elementary and junior high students participating in the program. Elementary participants were more likely to maintain their improved attendance following participation than were junior high participants. Nonetheless, junior high participant grade point averages increased during TCDP and were maintained subsequent to TCDP. TCDP was an effective intervention for improving attendance and academic performance and helping preclude future delinquency.     

Decentralization and Democratic Instability: The Case of Costa Rica

This article examines the consequences of the decentralization process that is under way in Costa Rica and which may undermine, rather than bolster, democracy in that country. I first outline three key contextual variables relating to the reform process: existing sociopolitical realities (constructing local legitimacy), the dynamics of the reform process (bottom-up versus top-down), and the timing or sequencing of the proposed reforms (what is being decentralized and when). Though I focus here on Costa Rica, these three variables are generally applicable in any case of decentralization. After considering these contextual factors, I evaluate the likelihood of four negative side effects arising from the ongoing decentralization process: party-system fragmentation, reinforced or mutated clientelism, intermunicipal conflict and polarization, and local government instability. Early evidence suggests that some of these effects, particularly party-system fragmentation and municipal instability, have begun to manifest themselves.