Are Political Parties More Responsive to Advocacy Groups Mobilising Core Voters or Swing Voters? Political Responsiveness to Citizens' Protest Movements in Swedish Local Governments

Political scientists often assume that parties listen to some voters more than others. However, this theoretical perspective has rarely been applied to explain political responsiveness to advocacy groups. This article argues that the type of voter mobilised by protest activities plays a role in determining whether advocacy groups are able to influence political decisions. The explanatory value of this approach is demonstrated by a study of the geographic distribution of school closures among Swedish local governments during the 2002–10 period. School issues have been important drivers of contentious politics in Sweden. Two hypotheses are tested. The first hypothesis predicts that protesters in districts with numerous swing voters are more likely to achieve their goals. The second hypothesis predicts that protesters in districts with numerous core voters are more likely to achieve their goals. In line with the swing hypothesis, the main results suggest that protesters are more likely to stop school closures in volatile polling districts.     

Coalitions in European Union Negotiations

Coalitions will probably become an increasingly important theme in European Union (EU) politics. The spread of decision making by majority voting promotes coalition‐building behaviour. The impending enlargement is predicted to differentiate and polarize policy standpoints within the EU. Increasing levels of policy conflict imply increased propensities for coalition building. Still, the role and nature of coalitions in EU negotiations are obscure. This article raises important research questions: What characterizes coalition building in the EU? How important are coalitions? What coalition patterns are discernible?Using data from a questionnaire to Swedish participants on EU committees, it is shown that coalitions are more frequent when majority voting occurs than when unanimity rules. Coalition behaviour is, however, important also under unanimity. The existence of consensus norms diminishes the propensity to form coalitions. As regards coalition patterns, there is a prevalence of coalitions based on policy interests and/or on cultural affinity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, consistent and durable coalition patterns seem to exist. The north–south divide is one such persistent pattern. The Swedish respondents thus reveal a close cooperation between the Nordic member states and Great Britain, whereas France and Spain are seldom approached for coalition‐building purposes. As to future research, evidence from other member states and from case studies is needed in order to learn more about the bases for coalition building in EU negotiations.     

Policing football crowds in Sweden

The policing of football crowds in Sweden is underpinned by a national coordination approach based upon a set of conflict reducing principles and supported by crowd theory. The approach is referred to as the Special Police Tactic (SPT). While focused on police capacity to exercise force, the SPT also gives primacy to tactics based upon communication, in the form of Dialogue Police. Existing research on the SPT focuses exclusively on the policing of protest crowds. This paper extends the existing literature by reporting on a large scale three-year observational research project examining the SPT as it is applied to football fixtures involving several of Sweden’s major football clubs. On the basis of our analysis we draw out how policing operations in line with facilitation and communication were associated with effective outcomes. However, we also highlight deficiencies in national coordination and coherence as well as highlighting important innovations with regard to approaches to dialogue with football fans. We explore the implications of our analysis for theoretical understanding of effective football crowd management and engagement with fan culture.     

Psychopathic traits in Finnish homicide offenders with schizophrenia

There is a paucity of studies examining psychopathy in comparable samples of violent individuals with and without psychotic illness. The main goal of the study was to assess the prevalence and nature of psychopathic traits as measured by PCL-R among Finnish homicide offenders with schizophrenia. Further, the impact of co-morbid psychopathy on the homicidal incidents, as well as the associations of psychopathy and offender background factors, among offenders with schizophrenia was investigated.A retrospective study was performed using extensive forensic psychiatric evaluation reports and crime reports as sources of information. The sample consisted of 72 homicide offenders with schizophrenia and 72 controls without psychotic illness.Psychopathic features were prevalent among Finnish homicide offenders with schizophrenia, although for the most parts to a lesser extent compared to other homicide offenders. Like non-mentally ill psychopathic offenders, offenders with schizophrenia and many psychopathic traits are likely to present early starting problems in many areas of life and they also commit homicides that resemble other psychopathic offenders' in their choice of victims, intoxication and post-offense behavior.The observed prevalence of psychopathic traits highlights the importance of psychopathy assessment among violence-prone individuals with schizophrenia. In most respects, offenders with schizophrenia and high levels of psychopathic traits seem to be similar to psychopathic offenders without psychotic illness, which has implications for early intervention and management.     

When Citizens Fight Back: Justice Sensitivity and Resistance to Political Reform

A considerable number of individuals show resistance to reform, whereas others, although similarly affected, do not react in a resistant way at all. Based on research showing that people differ concerning how sensitive they are toward being a victim of injustice (victim justice sensitivity), we argued that people high in victim justice sensitivity perceive a reform more as an illegitimate limitation to their freedom resulting in more reactance. Consequently, people high in victim justice sensitivity should show more resistance to reform. We conducted three studies to test these assumptions. Our studies revealed that physicians (healthcare reform, Study 1) and students (introduction of tuition fees, Studies 2 and 3) with higher victim justice sensitivity experienced more reactance and thus showed more resistance to reform. The implications of these results for the implementation of political reforms are discussed.     

The Intergenerational Cycle of Criminality—Association with Psychopathy*

Abstract: Preventive interventions early in life are likely to lower the risk of intergenerational transmission of criminal behavior. We investigated if psychopathy among homicidal offenders is associated with criminal offending among the offenders’ offspring. The basic sample consisted of consecutive Finnish homicide offenders (during 1995–2004) who had been subjected to a forensic psychiatric examination and rated for a file‐based PCL‐R, and their offspring. Criminal behavior among both genders of the offspring was more common than in the general population. In general, the offspring’s crimes against others (e.g., threat, intimidation, deprivation of freedom, breach of domicile) were associated with their parent’s psychopathy. A grandfather’s major mental disorder was associated with a high rate of crime committed by the offspring. Especially, the sons of male psychopathic homicidal offenders had the highest rate of committing crimes, which was often expressed as vandalism. However, both genders of offspring seem to require special preventive programs to ameliorate these problems.     

What Drives the Swing Voter in Africa?

What makes African voters “up for grabs”? Existing approaches to the swing voter have several liabilities. This article introduces a new measure enabling a more comprehensive assessment of swing voting, including the differentiation between clientelistic and collective goods motivations. The issue of swing voting is then brought to an environment where voters are rarely considered persuadable: Africa. Using a count‐model estimation technique and original survey data from Ghana's critical 2008 elections, the analysis challenges the near consensus in African politics on clientelism as the only electoral strategy. When voters perceive politicians as providing collective, developmental goods, the efficacy of clientelism as a tool to win over voters is reduced. Many persuadable voters can also be won over by both clientelistic and collective goods, thus contradicting the literature presenting these as mutually exclusive. Finally, the analysis shows that incumbents do better when they provide collective goods even in highly clientelistic environments.     

De-idealizing the democratic civil peace: on the political economy of democratic stabilization and pacification in Argentina and Ecuador

In the liberal concept of a ‘democratic civil peace’, an idealistic understanding of democratic stabilization and pacification prevails: democracy is seen to guarantee political stability and social peace by offering comprehensive representation and participation in political decisions while producing outcomes broadly in accordance with the common interest of society. This contrasts with the procedural quality and the material achievements of most, if not all, really existing democracies. South America is paradigmatic. Here, the legitimation of liberal democracy through both procedure and performance is weak and yet ‘third wave democracies’ have managed to survive even harsh economic and political crises. The article presents a conceptual framework to analyse historically specific patterns of democratic stabilization and pacification. Analyses of the processes of socio-political destabilization and re-stabilization in Argentina and Ecuador since the late 1990s show how a ‘de-idealized’ perspective on the democratic civil peace helps explain the viability of democratic regimes that systematically deviate from the ideal-type conditions for democratic survival that have been proposed in the literature.