Does the European Company Prevent the ‘Delaware Effect’?

Abstract This article analyses the history of EU company law and locates a stable ‘non‐competitive equilibrium’. This equilibrium follows from Member States that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. From the outset, Member States were determined to prevent the ‘Delaware effect’. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda‐setting in EU company law has changed little during the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure and regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as the recent enactment of the European Company has triggered discussion about competitive lawmaking in Europe.     

Regressive effects of regulation on wages

Public Choice - A growing body of literature analyzing the distributive consequences of regulation suggests that regulation may have particularly detrimental effects on lower-income households....     

Party system stability and conflict initiation

The study of interstate conflict has yielded a voluminous literature to date, yet much of the recent work has only just begun to underscore the importance of domestic factors in predicting conflict initiation in democracies. In short, some of these studies find that when electoral accountability is greater—measured in a variety of ways—interstate conflict becomes less likely. Despite this burgeoning literature, scholars have spent far less time analysing the role linkage institutions, such as stable party systems, have played in foreign policy discussions. To address this gap, we argue that in more stable party systems conflict initiation becomes less likely due to the greater accountability present in these systems. This conjecture is supported by the results of a time-series cross-sectional analysis of 48 democracies from 1978 to 2000 that uses multiple measures of conflict initiation and party system stability.     

Evaluation in France,a Component of Territorial Public Action

Evaluation practices developed in France, especially by local authorities and above all by regional councils, provide an interesting opportunity to examine from the inside the way public policies are constructed. Taking evaluation practices seriously as a subject of study reminds us, in a way, of the necessary empiricism needed to analyse public policies. At a time when this discipline experiences, at least in France, a surge in conceptual proposals, the point of view expressed here aims to point out the necessary modesty we have to show in the face of the complexity of the subjects studied and of the usefulness of evaluation practices to explain territorial public policies.