Informating policy and administration a comparative perspective on terrorism

The cliche that ‘one man's terroirist is another man' freedom fighter’ represents the major dilemma of anti-terrorism policymakers and administrators. The conceptual confusion is further complicated by the ideological orientations and policy interests of the observers. The comparative study of terrorism, however, has provided a conceptual underpinning and does provide the tools for sorting out the biases. This article compares the six principal models of political terrorism and suggests that each in fact describes a distinct form of political violence depending upon the perspective of the observer. Each of the forms of terrorism, moreover, may require a unique set of remedies. Using the widely publicized TWA bijacking during the summer of 1985 as an example, the analysis examines the differences in the American, Israeli, and Lebanese government perspectives and how those differences influenced policymaking.     

Affordability and mortgage design: Permanent buydowns and buyups

Abstract

A simulation model that mirrors the actual practices of lenders in setting qualification requirements for mortgage loans is used to assess the impact of permanent buydowns and buyups on the maximum sale price that buyers can afford. Buydowns are reductions in the coupon rate traded off against higher discount points; buyups are the reverse. Although buydowns have little effect on afford ability, buyups can have significant effects. Their potential is largely unrealized, however, because of the call risk to lenders of loans carrying premiums. The authors propose a “discount recovery” provision, which would be similar to a prepayment penalty except that the payment upon prepayment would be tied to the amount of the discount foregone by the lender. This would protect lenders against call risk, giving them every reason to offer buyups as a way of expanding demand.     

The persuasive power of a Committee Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC

This paper investigates persuasion as a means of influence for the Federal Reserve Chairman in meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Using textual records of FOMC meetings, federal funds rate targets have been recorded for Committee members who served in the Arthur Burns era (1970–1978). Results show that Burns-member differences in stated funds rate targets were lower when Burns made recommendations early in the meeting, consistent with the hypothesis that the Chairman is persuasive. Additional results show that members’ tendencies to respond to Burns's recommendations were related to their personal and political loyalties.     

Pigou, Coase, common law, and environmental policy: Implications of the calculation debate

The implications of the calculation debate are explored for Pigouvian, Coasean, and common-law liability approaches to externality problems. There is no escaping Hayekian-Misean information problems, but the institutional setting within which environmental policies are resolved affects the domain of third-party calculation. The calculation required is likely to be significantly less under common-law arrangements than under administrative processes. The primary implication for environmental policy is that increased reliance on competitive market processes and the common law in copying with externality problems may be more effective than attempts to improve current administrative approaches.     

Friends in high places: The wealth effects of JFK's assassination on the assets of LBJ's supporters

This paper uses anecdotal evidence to identify a group of firms that had significant ties to President Lyndon Johnson and determines the effect of Johnson's unexpected rise to the Presidency on the market value of these firms. The unexpected nature of President Kennedy's death eliminates the confounding event problem typically associated with election results. We are able to identify four separate portfolios of firms that had political ties to Lyndon Johnson. Our research suggests that the market expected significant benefits to accrue to these firms as a result of Johnson's becoming President. When Catholic John Kennedy and Johnson were running together in 1960 a joke hop-scotched around the parties in Texas and Washington that Kennedy had told Johnson, “Lyndon, when we get elected I'm going to dig a tunnel to the Vatican,” and Lyndon had replied, “That's OK with me as long as Brown & Root gets the contract” (Dugger, 1982: 286).