全文获取类型
收费全文 | 851篇 |
免费 | 24篇 |
专业分类
各国政治 | 39篇 |
工人农民 | 28篇 |
世界政治 | 130篇 |
外交国际关系 | 54篇 |
法律 | 275篇 |
中国政治 | 6篇 |
政治理论 | 341篇 |
综合类 | 2篇 |
出版年
2020年 | 4篇 |
2019年 | 8篇 |
2018年 | 21篇 |
2017年 | 13篇 |
2016年 | 19篇 |
2015年 | 21篇 |
2014年 | 21篇 |
2013年 | 181篇 |
2012年 | 13篇 |
2011年 | 17篇 |
2010年 | 17篇 |
2009年 | 30篇 |
2008年 | 19篇 |
2007年 | 31篇 |
2006年 | 20篇 |
2005年 | 13篇 |
2004年 | 24篇 |
2003年 | 16篇 |
2002年 | 19篇 |
2001年 | 17篇 |
2000年 | 14篇 |
1999年 | 11篇 |
1998年 | 15篇 |
1997年 | 11篇 |
1996年 | 13篇 |
1995年 | 13篇 |
1994年 | 10篇 |
1993年 | 13篇 |
1992年 | 15篇 |
1991年 | 11篇 |
1990年 | 17篇 |
1989年 | 9篇 |
1988年 | 15篇 |
1987年 | 27篇 |
1986年 | 16篇 |
1985年 | 20篇 |
1984年 | 13篇 |
1983年 | 10篇 |
1982年 | 6篇 |
1981年 | 9篇 |
1980年 | 8篇 |
1979年 | 9篇 |
1978年 | 10篇 |
1977年 | 9篇 |
1976年 | 6篇 |
1975年 | 9篇 |
1974年 | 4篇 |
1973年 | 9篇 |
1970年 | 3篇 |
1966年 | 3篇 |
排序方式: 共有875条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
41.
A constitutional interpretation of the firm 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Adam Gifford Jr. 《Public Choice》1991,68(1-3):91-106
When members of a firm make firm-specific investments they will earn rents. Potential rent-seeking on the part of the owner of the firm and other employees reduces the value of an employee's firm-specific investment and, as a result, reduces the level of those investments. In this context the firm can be thought of as a set of interdependent relationships where the actions of any one individual can affect the rents of all others. The owner of the firm will desire to set up an institutional arrangement to protect the individual's property rights in specific investments as part of his effort to maximize profit. Establishing this institutional arrangement is similar to the establishment of a constitution by the state or other organization. This constitution protects the property rights of the members of the firm and as a result encourages the creation of property, that is, the firm-specific investments. The constitution of a firm consists of a set of interdependent explicit and implicit contracts between the firm and its various members, as well as mechanisms for enforcing and monitoring these contracts. As a practical matter, it is obvious that workers normally do not enjoy costless or near-costless mobility, and thus an ordinary “at will” employment contract may no longer be sufficient to induce workers to join a firm. If, in order to function productively within an enterprise, individuals have to accumulate, and pay for, firm-specific capital assets, the simple neoclasical logic fails (Furubotn, 1988: 167). 相似文献
42.
Are federal courts sympathetic to local and state officials'cost concerns, particularly when it comes to meeting the requirementsof the Americans with Disabilities Act? This is the fundamentalquery taken up by this analysis. After examining twenty-eightfederal ADA cases where state and local officials have goneto court claiming that complying with this civil rights measurewould be unduly burdensome, this study comes up with mixed findings.In some cases, the courts have been sensitive to cost concernsbut, in others, they have not. Despite these inconclusive findings,this study does cast some light on what state and local officialsmust do if they expect federal courts to be sensitive to theirconcerns. 相似文献
43.
Franklin G. Mixon Jr. 《Public Choice》1995,83(1-2):127-137
This study provides evidence of public choice determinants of the penalties assessed by the Environmental Protection Agency for carbon emissions violations. Following the work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Tollison (1982), and Tullock (1989), this study points out that powerful business interest groups are able to use their political influence to shape EPA environmental policy for urban areas. The statistical estimates presented here suggest that business groups have limited power (through lobbying activity) in affecting the probability of the occurrence of an EPA citation for carbon emissions violations, while they may have considerable power in influencing thedegree of an EPA citation for carbon emissions standards, once a citation occurs. 相似文献
44.
45.
This paper analyzes principal-agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters, challengers, and incumbents. The introduction of a last period (via finite-livedness) in combination with voters' imperfect information about politicians' preferences causes time-varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians. Political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences, potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments. In the extreme, sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office. A systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist, and depends on how quickly sorting takes place. We show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences. In addition, if sorting is a significant feature of political markets, cross-sectional studies will tend to oversample little- and non-shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies. Reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed.We wish to thank John Bond, Donald Deere, Gertrud Fremling, Tim Gronberg, Michael Munger, Russell Roberts, and the participants of workshops at Dartmouth College, Texas A&M University, University of Houston, University of Texas, Yale Law School, and the 1987 Public Choice Meetings for valuable discussions on earlier drafts of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was issued as working paper E-87-34 by the Hoover Institution. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Sentencing Commission nor those of any of its Commissioners. Any remaining errors are of course our own. 相似文献
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.