Protestant Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law: Gadamer and Dworkin

Abstract. The rule of law demands that the state's coercive power be used only according to settled general laws, applied impersonally. But an individualist theory of legal inter pretation cannot provide the shared understanding required. Gadamer appeals to the practical wisdom of judges and lawyers, who will agree on how to apply law to new cases. But this account is adequate only for very cohesive societies. Dworkin's account rests on propositional knowledge of a supposed best interpretation of an entire legal system. But even if such a best interpretation is possible in theory, this possibility does not provide shared understandings in the social world.     

Public Participation in Environmental Regulatory Conflicts: Treading Through the Possibilities and Pitfalls*

Based on two years of qualitative field work, this paper examines public participation in environmental regulatory disputes. Drawing on political economy critiques of environmentalism, we argue that regulation is both a political arena and a legal process that is about responsivity, competition, and bargaining. A combination of case study and Boolean algebra techniques are used to refine and apply the conceptualization. Five primary factors are identified which mediate citizens' participation: (I) information networks, (2) social resources, (3) cooperative linkages, (4) the ability to sustain linkages and levels of resource mobilization over time, and (5) agendas which fit within the narrow constitutive norms of a particular regulatory community.     

The Sheffield School and Discourse Theory: Divergences and Similarities in Legal Idealism/Anti‐Positivism*

Abstract. When first I began this paper, I envisaged it as a fairly straightforward exercise in comparison between the Sheffield School’s and Discourse Theory’s varieties of legal idealism or anti‐positivism (these terms being synonymous for the types of theory that contest positivism’s separation thesis, that is, the contention that there is no necessary conceptual connection between law and morality). One obvious distinction, for example, is between the moral substance at the heart of these respective theories: the Sheffield School’s legal theory being founded on Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency, and Alexy’s theory focusing on Radbruch’s intolerable degree of injustice. However, the more I thought about the two respective theories, the more interested I became in one particular issue: the denial of the separation thesis that constitutes legal idealism. Here, I present a paper which is not so much concerned with the substance of two different types of legal idealism or anti‐positivism, but which focuses on the question of whether and in what way either or both of the theories can correctly be characterised as legal idealist or anti‐positivist. I focus in this paper on two works in particular: Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s Law as a Moral Judgment (1994), and Robert Alexy’s The Argument from Injustice (2002).     

Internet Regulation Process Model: The Effect of Societies,Communities, and Governments

The Internet is often seen as borderless and unmanageable and, therefore, not fully understandable. Starting from the assumption that it can be understood, we begin an attempt to organize the Internet by characterizing it as a behavior space in which groups categorized as societies, communities, and governments interact. We emphasize the utility of organizing the Internet and focus specifically on attempts by societies, communities, and governments to regulate the flow of information. We posit an Internet regulation process model that, we believe, explains most of the efforts to regulate the Internet. In addition, we provide some insight into the relationships between and within the various groups involved. Our conclusions center on the observation that political power (especially Western political power) has been a defining factor in the regulation of the Internet as governments have played a prominent role in regulatory action.