The distribution of income in a despotic society

A distribution of income between rulers and subjects can be derived as an equilibrium of violence, rather than from considerations of marginal products of owned factors of production. Society is organized in ranks, and the occupants of each rank are provided with incomes just sufficient that obedience is preferable to rebellion. To incorporate such considerations into a model, it is necessary to recognize phenomena that are normally excluded from economic analysis: combat, the mortality rate (from natural causes and from violence) as a component of the utility function, and a rudimentary technology of control.     

Decentralized planning in Kenya

In 1983 the Government of Kenya embarked on an accelerated programme of decentralization known as ‘District Focus’. This exercise in devolution is aimed at promoting more effective and efficient use of scarce domestic resources through efforts to strengthen planning capacity at the district level, improve horizontal integration among operating ministry field agents, and expand authority to district heads of operating ministries for managing financial and procurement aspects of local project implementation. Given the importance of this initiative to the economic growth of Kenya and the current search for administrative reforms that could help accelerate rural development in Africa, District Focus merits close attention by development experts. This article reviews the historical background, content, and implementation progress of District Focus.     

Mobilization and participation: Singapore in the 1980s

Singapore is an island state with no formal lower tier of government. The network of consultation and mobilization created after Independence in 1959 is now raising important issues of consensus and compliance. Twenty-five years of continuous one-party rule offer opportunities to evaluate the working of the mechanisms of integration and participation. In the late 1980s the highly urbanized, multi-ethnic society is placing new demands on the government, and questions of decentralization and feedback are high on the political agenda.     

A new typology for R&D laboratories: Implications for policy analysts

Science policy analysts have traditionally classified R&D laboratories as government, private, or university. The authors argue that this view is outmoded and provides little help in understanding the rapidly changing environment of R&D laboratories. They provide and test an alternative scheme designed to cope with “sector blurring” and the intermingling of market and political influences on R&D laboratories. The authors also discuss implications of their scheme for a variety of contemporary science policy issues.     

Comparative Green Politics: Beyond the European Context?

It is argued that there are significant differences between green electoral politics in Europe and green developments in the affluent non-European west, and that these are such that, despite the greater political formalization of the green movement in Western Europe, there is a sense in which North American and Antipodean developments are ultimately more fundamental than those that have occurred in Europe. Loosely adopting explanatory categories employed by Rudig and Lowe in a Political Studies article, we examine evidence under four sub-heads: electoral thresholds; the historical legacy of the environment movement; the different contextual roles played by the anti-nuclear movement and wilderness experience, and ecology, Marxism and the new left.     

Aid and ideology

Abstract. A conceptualization of international aid-giving behaviour, based on the notion of bounded rationality and involving the interaction of objective and subjective factors, is developed. From this conceptualization, four hypotheses are deduced to explain the variation of development aid expenditures as a percentage of GNP: the instrumental hypothesis, the humanitarian hypothesis, the ideological hypothesis, and the incremental hypothesis. These hypotheses are tested on data concerning aid allocations of 17 OECD donors for four points in time (1966, 1971, 1976, and 1981), through the use of a regression model. Results show that the model as a whole explains between 85% and 96% of the variance in the dependent variable. Tests of individual hypotheses show that the instrumental explanation is the best predictor of aid as a percentage of GNP if a lagged value of the dependent variable is used on the right-hand side of the equation. When the lagged value of the dependent variable is dropped from the equations, the best predictor is the ideological explanation. The contribution of the humanitarian explanation to the explained variance is negligible.