Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking

Recent formal models of legislatures have proved that equilibrium outcomes are extremely unlikely without either (1) extreme restrictions upon preferences or (2) constraints upon the agenda. The implication is that constant instability or dictatorial manipulation is the norm in politics. This paper argues to the contrary, that legislatures (and other political processes) are characterized by some regularities, and that equilibrium models are the appropriate technique to use in describing these regularities. Examples from economic theory are used to illustrate this principle. The assumption of equilibrium is methodological, committing the researcher to develop models that have specific empirical implications. Using analogies from the economic theories of general equilibrium, oligopoly, and demand revealing processes, some potentially fruitful means of developing equilibrium political models are described. Assuming that legislators may freely make binding contracts has both empirical and normative advantages. Finally, institutional restrictions on legislative agendas may assure equilibrium. These include ‘constitutional’ rules, agreements to share ‘pork barrel’ projects evenly, limitation of committees to specific policy arenas, and the election of leaders who then determine the voting agenda.     

Technology transfer in the petroleum industry

The energy industry, especially the petroleum, is critically important to today's society. This industry has historically been accused of being a “good old boy” network that is extremely reluctant and slow to accept technology and change. A closer analysis of the industry shows that it is highly fragmented consisting mostly of firms who operate in only a limited number of functional areas. The analysis also shows that there are many critical current and future problems which could be addressed with technology from any diverse disciplines and industries. Case analyses of existing technology flow through to successful utilization by the petroleum industry describes the technology transfer process and the role played by the different firms inside and outside the industry.     

Criminal justice/criminology journal rankings: ASC versus ACJS

This note analyzes the perceived prestige rankings of selected criminal justice/criminology journals comparing samples from the American Society of Criminology (ASC) and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS). The results indicate that inter- and intrasample comparisons show little agreement with regard to the rankings along both quality and consistency dimensions. However, a closer analysis shows that no significant differences were found between the journal mean weights assigned by members of ASC and ACJS. It is argued that research into journal prestige is important for researchers/authors, editors, and publishers of journals, as well as the consumers of journals.     

Stinging the Detroit criminal: A total system perspective

The success of sting operations (fake-fences) has been reported widely with impressive aggregate statistics on arrests and convictions. In this paper, we present a more detailed view of a successful Detroit sting program. We follow a sting participant's involvement from the time he entered the storefront until final sentencing, the result of the sting. Previously unreported statistics that we present include prior convictions and sentences for those involved in the sting, the number of sales an individual made to the sting and data on final sentences. More importantly we explore relationships between the various statistics. Our most important finding is that a sting operation is an effective way of getting criminals off the streets for extended periods of time. Eighty percent of those convicted for receiving and concealing stolen property were incarcerated, and the average minimum sentence was 19 months. The data also suggest the importance of multiple sales by an individual to the sting. The number of sales was shown to affect both the likelihood of conviction and the type of sentence imposed.