Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation

A psychological tax contract goes beyond the traditional deterrence model and explains tax morale as a complicated interaction between taxpayers and the government. As a contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract party, tax compliance is increased by sticking to the fiscal exchange paradigm between citizens and the state. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good equivalent to tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and legitimate. Moreover, friendly treatment of taxpayers by the tax office in auditing processes increases tax compliance.     

EXPLAINING THE WILLINGNESS OF PUBLIC PROFESSIONALS TO IMPLEMENT PUBLIC POLICIES: CONTENT,CONTEXT, AND PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS

The willingness of public professionals to implement policy programmes is important for achieving policy performance. However, few scholars have developed and tested systematic frameworks to analyze this issue. In this study, we address this by building and testing an appropriate framework. The aims have been: (1) to build a three‐factor model (policy content, organizational context, and personality characteristics) for explaining willingness to implement policies; and (2) to quantitatively test the model through a survey of Dutch professionals. The results show that policy content is the most important factor in explaining willingness. Nevertheless, organizational context and the personality characteristics of implementers also have a significant effect and should be considered when studying the attitudes of professionals towards policies. This research helps in understanding the willingness or resistance of professionals when it comes to implementing policies.     

City size and citizens' satisfaction: two competing theories revisited

Abstract. The Reform Theory and the Political Economy Theory postulate contradictory effects of government size on citizens' satisfaction with urban services. The former asserts that citizens' satisfaction increases with increasing size of urban governments because large units are more efficient and allows citizens to participate effectively in public policy-making. The latter postulates that citizens are more satisfied in the smaller jurisdictions because small units are more homogeneous, efficient and democratic. A series of tests performed in this study overwhelmingly supports the Political Economy Theory: citizens in small jurisdictions hold more favourable attitudes towards participation and democracy, and the smaller units are more homogeneous and more efficient in the provision of services. This in turn leads to more favourable evaluations of public services.     

GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT? THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE OF FOREST CERTIFICATION IN SWEDEN

The role and capacity of the state are changing. Some researchers argue that the state is transforming, strategically adapting to new circumstances, while others see a development of governing arrangements that are autonomous from the state, governing 'without' government. This article assesses the governing without government thesis through the case of forest certification introduced in Sweden in the late 1990s. This is a case of private governance, the governing capacity of which is based on voluntary self-regulation rather than government authority, seemingly a prime example of governing without government. The results show that government nonetheless is involved with forest certification through governance-oriented modes of governing: enabling and influencing the arrangements. Thus, what appeared to be a prime example of governing 'without' government is better understood as governing 'with' government.     

Television and the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections

We use the structure of media markets within states and across state boundaries to study the relationship between television and electoral competition. In particular, we compare incumbent vote margins in media markets where content originates in the same state as media consumers versus vote margins where content originates out of state. This contrast provides a clear test of whether or not television coverage correlates with the incumbency advantage. We study U.S. Senate and state gubernatorial races from the 1950s through the 1990s and find that the effect of TV is small, directionally indeterminate, and statistically insignificant.     

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE NETWORKS: COMPATIBLE OR NOT?

This paper investigates the relationship between representative democracy and governance networks at a theoretical level. It does so by offering four conjectures and their implications for theory and practice. The incompatibility conjectures rests on the primacy of politics and sees governance networks as a threat. The complementarity conjecture presents governance networks as a means of enabling greater participation in the policy process and sensitivity in programme implementation. The transitional conjecture posits a wider evolution of governance forms towards network relationships. The instrumental conjecture views governance networks as a powerful means through which dominant interests can achieve their goals. Illustrative implications for theory and practice are identified, in relation to power in the policy process, the public interest, and the role of public managers. The heuristic potential of the conjectures is demonstrated through the identification of an outline research agenda.