Terrorist Decision Making and the Deterrence Problem

An ongoing debate among policymakers and terrorism scholars concerns the effectiveness of deterrence as a counterterrorism tool. Absent from the debate is a discussion of the complex nature of terrorist decision making. Decisions are made at varying levels in a terrorist organization, often by actors having different motives, resulting in behavior that is not always fully rational. This article identifies several circumstances when terrorist behavior is not the product of an entirely unitary, rational decision-making process, and therefore highlights when deterrence policies will be least effective. It concludes with some policy implications for understanding when deterrence policies are most likely to succeed and how to address terrorism in other situations.     

Police Perceptions of Irrational Unstable Behaviours and Use of Force

Police identification of people experiencing mental illness is usually based on either the person having an official contact history with police or through observing behavioural indicators commonly associated with mental illness during an encounter. Police have voiced concerns with their ability to identify and respond to people experiencing mental illness in a timely way and report that they commonly resort to more coercive tactical options to resolve encounters. The present study employed a mixed method design to examine 286 police use of force incidents to investigate the association between force used on and by offenders displaying irrational-unstable behavioural characteristics. The irrational-unstable offenders were two times more likely to be perceived by police to have an apparent mental disorder and almost four times more likely to have a known mental health history; one in six had an official record of contact with mental health services. There were few differences in police and offender use of force, considering force as both a categorical and a continuous variable, while incident-level comparisons suggested that police force was generally proportional to offender resistance. Implications are discussed in terms of the need to redress limitations with the traditional police approach style.     

THE LIMITED ROLE OF CHANGING AGE STRUCTURE IN EXPLAINING AGGREGATE CRIME RATES*

Changes in the age structure are shown to have a limited impact on aggregate crime rates. Even the dramatic transformation of the age distribution accompanying the baby boom shifted crime rates by no more than 1 % per year. Projected changes in the age distribution between 1995 and 2010 will lead to slight declines in per capita crime rates. These results are at odds with recent predictions of an impending demographically driven crime wave. Such predictions have focused exclusively on a rise in juvenile crime and ignored the offsetting decreases among adults.     

CARICOM states and the WTO dispute settlement system: the case for greater engagement

This paper examines the participation of member states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’s dispute settlement system and its associated negotiations. In so doing, it highlights the dispute settlement system’s important contribution to the WTO and the need for CARICOM member states to engage more actively with this aspect of the WTO’s work. The paper concludes by articulating some of the lessons learnt from CARICOM member states’ experiences to date and offering some concrete suggestions on how the region can improve its current record of engagement.