VICTORY IS NOT POSSIBLE: A REJOINDER TO THE STRATEGIC MYTHMAKERS

The current strategic planning for nuclear war is based on the assumptions that it is an effective way to deter the Soviet Union and that we can actually survive such a war. These are erroneous, for the Soviets are not likely to be any more deterred by our plans for nuclear war than they are by our current strategy. The illusion that "victory" is possible in a nuclear war overlooks the medical and other evidence about the extent of death, injury and disease that a nuclear war would bring. War should be conducted with a view of post-war benefit in mind, but a nuclear war would yield no benefits, regardless of the futile and even delirious efforts to make evacuation plans for major cities in the event of nuclear war.     

On equity in intergroup exchange process,outcome distributions,and some considerations of cognitive orientation

Interactive behavior, viewed on a continuum ranging from intragroup to intergroup situations, is modeled in an attempt to describe the effectiveness of feedback structures in the modification of exchange equity. It is concluded that intragroup situations permit the use of feedback in the alternation of interpersonal equity relations, but that the corresponding application to integroup structures is highly limited. Collectivities that do not constitute groups in the traditional sociological sense are difficult to manipulate and care must be taken to select aspects of interactive outcomes shared by participants if attempts to modify unjust interactive structures are to be successful.     

China's State-Owned Enterprises in the First Reform Decade: An Analysis of a Declining Monopsony

We study the evolution of employment and wage outcomes in Chinese SOEs during the first decade of economic reforms, using a panel of data for almost 1000 enterprises covering the years 1980–90. Unlike the 1990s, which were marked by growing labor redundancy in the SOE sector, we find that CPE-fostered capital-intensity remained so extreme during the 1980s that workers' marginal products exceeded their full wages, just as in a classical monopsony outcome. Consistent with reasoning about the impact of competition upon monopsony, however, we find the marginal product-wage gap declined in the face of market-oriented reforms, and that monopsony was weakest where the state sector's shares of industrial output and enterprises were lowest, and for smaller enterprises and enterprises managed by lower levels of government. Our analysis also supports Xu and Zhuang's (1996) finding that bonus payments increased enterprises' revenues by more than it did their costs.     

Coordinating intermediary peace efforts

Multiple peace-making efforts by intermediaries can be a blessing or a curse, particularly in ethnic, religious, or other types of communal conflicts. The author outlines four general ways in which multiple interventions can hamper peacemaking, as well as the different types of intermediaries and de-escalating activities that can help efforts to achieve conflict resolution. Multiple intermediaries can work effectively either in sequence or contemporaneously; coordination of such activities is vital. Based on the analysis presented here, the author offers four different strategies to maximize the benefits of multiple intermediaries in peacemaking.He was the founding director of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflict at Syracuse, has written extensively on international conflict resolution, and is completing the book,Toward Constructive Struggle.     

Revolution,longevity and legitimacy in communist states

This article examines key linkages in the dramatic turn of events in totalitarian states by reviewing the literature on regime legitimacy and longevity in communist regimes. But that longevity is a poor substitute for legitimacy. Eastern Europe states, where communist rule was externally imposed, were relatively “easy” to overcome. However, changes occurring in countries where quasi-legitimacy was achieved by mass movements, as in China or the Soviet Union; and those under family dictatorships, such as North Korea and Cuba, are not as subject to collapse. These pseudo forms of legitimacy resist liberalization in political terms, although economic changes are increasingly feasible as a half-way house. Still it is now clear that longevity in and of itself is not a substitute for legitimacy. The former is a function of time, the latter of social structure. This paper was written and accepted for publication in the wake of events following the collapse of communist power in most states of Eastern Europe during 1989. It does not cover the events which led to the collapse of communist power in the Soviet Union during 1991. Rather than simply adjust the paper to reflect current events, I take this opportunity to simply note the time frame during which the paper was produced. Indeed, I would also note that the Russian Revolution of 1991 served to delegitimize communist power by the exposure and then collapse of the coup attempt orchestrated by the KGB, a sector of the military elite and the upper stratum of the Communist Politburo. Such delegitimation accelerated a process of communist disintegration that could have taken a much longer period of time, and with possibly a different set of outcomes. [ILH] Irving Louis Horowitz is Hannah Arendt distinguished professor of sociology and political science at Rutgers University. He has written widely on developmental subjects, includingThree Worlds of Development (1965);Equity, Income, and Policy: Comparative Studies in Three Worlds of Development (1977); andBeyond Empire and Revolution (1982); all published by Oxford University Press.