Toward a New Era of Administrative Reform? The Myth of Post‐NPM in New Zealand

This article explores the supposed shift from New Public Management (NPM) to a new era of “post‐NPM” by looking at one critical case, New Zealand. It finds limited evidence of such a shift, suggesting that the wider literature needs to move to a more careful methodological treatment of empirical patterns. To contribute to such a move, this article applies a three‐pronged approach to the study of changing doctrines in executive government. After setting out the broad contours of what NPM and post‐NPM supposedly constitute, the article proceeds to a documentary analysis of State Services Commission doctrines; this is followed by an analysis of “Public Service Bargains” based on elite interviews and finally a case‐study approach of the Crown Entities Act 2004. Far from a new era of administrative reform, the “messy” patterns that emerge suggest a continuation of traditional understandings and ad hoc and politically driven adjustments, leading to diversification.     

The British Regulatory State under the Coalition Government: Volatile Stability Continued

What have been the effects of coalition government on the British regulatory state? This article argues that the politics of regulation have been largely about a continuation of existing patterns, namely volatile stability rather than more far‐reaching change. The British regulatory state continues to be defined by boundary conflicts between the world of ‘politics’ and ‘regulation’, by conflicting calls for centralisation and decentralised autonomy, and by tensions between the wish to ‘reduce’ regulation and the realisation of inherent complexities.     

Rights, Performatives, and Promises in Karl Olivecrona's Legal Theory

Abstract.  Karl Olivecrona (1971 ) maintains that "right" is a "hollow word," and so also for some other legal terms. "Right," he says, "has no conceptual background." He arrives at this position after an examination of metaphysical and naturalistic accounts, including American legal realism. Some of Olivecrona's arguments will be evaluated here. His position is influenced by Hägerström's theory of legal language, but he argues that Hägerström fails to account for how such terms as "right,""duty," etc. function in legal discourse and why they are useful. A parallel approach is also found in Olivecrona's book The Problem of the Monetary Unit (1957 ). Olivecrona is left with the problem of how such "hollow" terms function. His explanation is largely psychological. Going beyond J. L. Austin's notion of performatory language, he introduces the idea of performatory imperatives. I propose to submit Olivecrona's approach to a critical examination. It is suggested that had he started from everyday, nonlegal promises and commitments he might well have ended up with a different theory of legal language.