Mariano Arista and the 1850 Presidential Election in Mexico

Abstract – This article examines the 1850 presidential election in Mexico. It is divided into five sections: party political background, electoral regulations, candidates, campaign, results. General Mariano Arista was the successful candidate in what was the first genuinely contested presidential election since independence.     

Institutionalising electoral uncertainty and authoritarian regime survival

Authoritarian incumbents routinely use democratic emulation as a strategy to extend their tenure in power. Yet, there is also evidence that multiparty competition makes electoral authoritarianism more vulnerable to failure. Proceeding from the assumption that the outcomes of authoritarian electoral openings are inherently uncertain, it is argued in this article that the institutionalisation of elections determines whether electoral authoritarianism promotes stability or vulnerability. By ‘institutionalisation’, it is meant the ability of authoritarian regimes to reduce uncertainty over outcomes as they regularly hold multiparty elections. Using discrete-time event-history models for competing risks, the effects of sequences of multiparty elections on patterns of regime survival and failure in 262 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010 are assessed, conditioned on their degree of competitiveness. The findings suggest that the institutionalisation of electoral uncertainty enhances authoritarian regime survival. However, for competitive electoral authoritarian regimes this entails substantial risk. The first three elections substantially increase the probability of democratisation, with the danger subsequently diminishing. This suggests that convoking multiparty competition is a risky game with potentially high rewards for autocrats who manage to institutionalise elections. Yet, only a small number of authoritarian regimes survive as competitive beyond the first few elections, suggesting that truly competitive authoritarianism is hard to institutionalise. The study thus finds that the question of whether elections are dangerous or stabilising for authoritarianism is dependent on differences between the ability of competitive and hegemonic forms of electoral authoritarianism to reduce electoral uncertainty.     

Wasting a Crisis? Democracy and Markets in Britain after 2007

The banking crisis of 2007-2008 briefly threatened to overturn a system of market government that had lasted for nearly three decades—a system designed to minimise democratic control over markets. The crisis drew politicians once more into financial politics and exposed bankers and banking institutions to popular criticism and control. But the development of regulatory debates, and of the institutions designed to manage the crisis, have combined to avert this threat to the established order. The crisis is being 'wasted': it is failing to produce radical reforms. The paper establishes the intellectual and institutional origins of this failure, and argues that, while the reform window is closing, it is not yet fully shut: there exists yet scope for radical argument and popular mobilisation in the creation of a financial system with fewer pathological features.     

Towards a management renewal of the United Nations—Part I

This article addresses the hitherto largely neglected subject of administrative reform of the United Nations—without which, the capacity of the Organization to carry out its increasingly critical global mandates effectively and efficiently, is severely constrained, with efforts in this direction being for the most part incremental, indecisive and ineffectual. The problems arise partly from the originating and continuing model for the UN's organization and culture, which predate the advent, for example, of modern automated systems of personnel and financial management. Other elements of the problem arise from the UN's system of governance—the oversight committees, senior staff nominations by Member States, allocation of funds or approvals for critical management and administrative reforms. As at the national level, impactful UN reform also requires internal management leadership, follow-up, the continuity and UN experience of top officials, capacity to design and implement measures, and budget flexibility to procure outside expertise. In a second, concluding, part of the article, the authors will suggest a strategy for UN reform and a process for carrying forward a ‘renewal exercise’ to equip the Organization for its role beyond the year 2000. © 1996 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tolerant,If Personal Goals Remain Unharmed: Explaining Supranational Bureaucrats' Attitudes to Organizational Change

Growth in membership and intensifying responsibilities require much greater adaptability in organizational structures and administrative arrangements at international than at national levels. The ongoing transformation toward multilevel governance seems to empower international organizations and thus shines a new spotlight on international civil servants. We know little, however, about what motivates this growing class of bureaucratic elite. Against this background, this article explores the question as to how officials of the European Commission relate to the recent management modernization within their institution (Kinnock reform). Competing explanatory approaches (opportunity, socialization, and governance views) are used to develop hypotheses about the relationship between Commission officials and their acceptance of or opposition to administrative reform. The main finding is that the individual attitudes of Commission officials toward administrative change can best be explained by the opportunity model, which emphasizes the rational calculation of individual costs and benefits.