DENYING THE GUILTY MIND: ACCOUNTING FOR INVOLVEMENT IN A WHITE-COLLAR CRIME*

This study of convicted white-collar offenders treats their explanations for involvement in criminal activities. It focuses specifically on the techniques that are used to deny criminality. The strategies used to accomplish this end are detailed. It is suggested that the accounts developed by white-collar offenders to explain involvement in criminal activities are structured by the mechanics, histories, and organizational formats of offenses and by the requirement that they defeat the conditions of successful degradation ceremonies. In conclusion, some preliminary observations concerning the causes of white-collar crime are made.     

HOW TO BE SOPHISTICATED, LIE, CHEAT, BLUFF AND WIN AT POLITICS

Abstract. This paper presents an informal argument about the relationship between strategic interaction and'economic'theories of political processes. It is concerned with interactions between small groups of rational actors, in which each knows the preferences of the others and is attempting to get the better of the others. In these circumstances, the outcome is usually determined by the strategic interaction involved and is often, therefore, rather unstable. Since formal models in themselves do not help us very much to interpret the processes involved, the bulk of the paper is concerned with an analysis of various aspects of strategic interaction. These include being sophisticated, lying, cheating and bluffing.     

COMPUTERIZING THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM: AN OPERATIONAL STRATEGY IN LIEU OF A POLICY STRATEGY?

The operational strategy for social security — how to computerize one of the largest manually-dominated ‘sort, act and file’ operations in the country — is the emerging product of work which began in 1977 and has thus far produced a discussion document (DHSS 1980), a strategy proposals document (DHSS 1982), a high-level seminar (DHSS 1983) and a wide range of consultations. A ministerial response to the strategy — likely to be the go-ahead with only marginal amendments — was due before now but was delayed because of the general election. What are the insights which the development of this strategy provides for those interested in public policy analysis? What are the questions which its nature and prospects poses for public administration? This paper is concerned not with the technical issues involved in the development of feasible database strategies but with the issues to which the strategy gives rise. After a brief outline of the main features of the operational strategy, it discusses the possible implications of the strategy for clients of the social security system, and then examines some issues of policy co-ordination, inheritance and flexibility thrown up by the exercise.     

HOT SPOTS OF PREDATORY CRIME: ROUTINE ACTIVITIES AND THE CRIMINOLOGY OF PLACE*

A leading sociological theory of crime is the “routine activities” approach (Cohen and Felson, 1979). The premise of this ecological theory is that criminal events result from likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians against crime converging nonrandomly in time and space. Yet prior research has been unable to employ spatial data, relying instead on individual- and household-level data, to test that basic premise. This analysis supports the premise with spatial data on 323,979 calls to police over all 115,000 addresses and intersections in Minneapolis over 1 year. Relatively few “hot spots” produce most calls to Police (50% of calls in 3% of places) and calls reporting predatory crimes (all robberies at 2.2% of places, all rapes at 1.2% of places, and all auto thefts at 2.7% of places), because crime is both rare (only 3.6% of the city could have had a robbery with no repeat addresses) and concentrated, although the magnitude of concentration varies by offense type. These distributions all deviate significantly, and with ample magnitude, from the simple Poisson model of chance, which raises basic questions about the criminogenic nature of places, as distinct from neighborhoods or collectivities.     

ARE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS A VALID INDICATOR OF THE INDEX CRIMES? AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER WITH MINOR QUALIFICATIONS*

For more than two decades, the validity and reliability of official statistics on crime have been treated as highly questionable. Recently a number of studies have investigated the construction of official statistics on crime and issues related to their reliability and validity. However, there has been no recent attempt to bring together and evaluate these studies; thus, we do not know what official statistics mean and how we should interpret them. In the present paper it is argued that it is now possible to develop an understanding of what official statistics measure. It appears that both citizens and the police are in general agreement about what a serious crime is: it involves bodily injury (or serious threat of bodily injury), the property stolen is of high value, the act is committed by a stranger, or it involves breaking and entering. The authors argue that the perceived seriousness of the crime, first and primarily as defined by the victim, second as determined by the police, apparently accounts for most of the variance in whether a crime is reported and officially recorded; personal characteristics of the offender and victim have only minor effects. It is concluded that the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), as measured by the FBI Index of Crime, are valid indicators of serious crimes as defined by the citizenry. The evidence supporting this conclusion is very substantial with regard to motor vehicle theft, robbery, burglary, and homicide, while with larceny, rape, and aggravated assault, the evidence supporting this conclusion is substantial but does require the interpretation of conflicting evidence.