The political economy of sugar legislation

The findings of this paper are a rather straightforward account of the political economy of senatorial voting on the sugar program. In the spirit of Stigler and Peltzman's accounts of interest group activity, voting on sugar is indeed related to the concentration of economic interests in the Senators' states. States with high concentrations of sugar growers and processing tend to vote for the program, those with high concentration of users tend to vote against it. The emergence of corn syrup as a sugar substitute and its subsequent interests in the program further supports this perspective. These concentrated interests are associated with conditions ripe for overcoming the collective action problem and, we infer, use their organizations to influence senatorial behavior. The political variables suggest countervailing forces which can be interpreted, at least in part, as further examples of organized (here, politically organized) influences on the interests of Senators. Thus, while the model is one of opposing interests, those of producers and users tend to influence different Senators. The major group-interest trade-off, then, is between the pull of organized interests in the constituency with that of party organization at the national (or national institutional level), at least for those for whom the pull is in opposite directions.It is clear, then, that variables representing (concentrated) consumer interests as well as variables representing grower and processor interests as well as variables representing grower and processor interests are significant in determining voting patterns on sugar legislation in the Senate. This model, therefore, is not one in which one-sided organizational interests operate politically uncontested. That, even so, consumer interests are not powerful enough to prevent sugar programs from passing is clear at one level, due to the existence of the program over most of this period. The existing level of the transfers from consumers to producers and of deadweight losses must be reflective of the magnitude of their respective free rider problems. Yet voting on the program to renew or alter those benefits at any level clearly reflects these interests and their interplay.     

Reviews

Ference Feher, Agnes Heller and Gyorgy Markus, Dictatorship Over Needs, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, xiii+312 pp. £22.50.

Pierre Kende and Zdenek Strmiska, (Eds.) Egalités et inégalités en Europe de l’ Est, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1984.

Lewis H. Siegelbaum, The Politics of Industrial Mobilisation in Russia, 1914–17: A Study of the War‐Industries Committees, London, Macmillan (in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford), 1983, xix + 312 pp. £25.00

William J. Conyngham, The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 332 + ix. £19–50.

Caroline Humphrey, Karl Marx Collective: Economy, society and religion in a Siberian collective farm. Cambridge, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1983. xviii + 522 pp. £30–00 (£10–95 paperback).

Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym, Soviet Jewish Emigration and Soviet Nationality Policy, London, Macmillan, 1984, vii + 185 pp. £20.00.

James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine 1918–1933, Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., Cambridge, Mass. 1983. xiv + 334 pp. $21.50.

Kalman Rupp, Entrepreneurs in Red, State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1983. 260 + xvii pp. £37.60 (hardback) £14.25 (paperback).

Cole Blasier, The Giant's Rival: the USSR and Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983, xvi + 213 pp. $7.95 (paperback).     

The origins of penal populism

Five years ago after 46 years of daily deadlines – the last 38 on The Guardian – I retired to explore, with the help of Joseph Rowntree Foundation and Nuffield College Oxford fellowships, just how much influence was played by the media in the policy making process. The exercise was prompted by rising public concern over the ever widening power of the media. Onora O'Neill, the philosopher, in her Reith lectures in 2002 on trust in public institutions, noted with irony that the main champion of transparency and accountability – the media – were themselves the least transparent and accountable group in democracy. Anthony Sampson, a distinguished journalist, in his fourth edition of Anatomy of Britain in 2004, documented just how entrenched this perception was.