Would a Value‐Added System of Retention Improve the Distribution of Teacher Quality? A Simulation of Alternative Policies

In this paper, we consider several features of teacher‐retention policies based on value‐added measures of effectiveness under a variety of empirically grounded rules and parameters. We consider the effects of policy design by varying the standard above which satisfactory teachers are expected to perform. We simulate recently adopted policies that remove teachers based on consecutive unsatisfactory performance and compare these to policies that remove teachers based on poor performance on average over a multiyear period. We also consider the precision of the performance measure and the underlying variation in teacher quality on policy effects. Finally, the simulation makes a step forward by incorporating recent empirical findings of a relationship between teacher quality and natural attrition from the profession. Our results indicate that deselection policies based on value‐added measures have the potential to improve teacher quality, although understanding the role of policy design, self‐selected exits, and the underlying variation in teacher quality is essential for determining policy effects.     

The Effects of Uncontested Elections on Legislator Performance

Political competition lies at the core of representative democracy. Yet, uncompetitive elections and uncontested races are widespread in the United States, particularly at the state level. In this article, we analyze the consequences of uncontested elections on lawmaking activity. Our primary hypothesis is that legislators who run unopposed are less active lawmakers than those who were selected through competitive elections. Studying roll‐call vote participation and bill introduction and enactment for most of the U.S. states for 1999–2000, we find that state legislators elected in unopposed elections perform more poorly compared to their colleagues elected in competitive contests.     

‘Iraq: A note

Gordon Harmon was born in China in 1900 and after the First World War served in the Salt Revenue Guards for a number of years. After the outbreak of WWII he was posted in a liaison role to the centre of Chinese government in Chungking. There he worked with Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist Intelligence Service. But he also had quite close links with Chou En-Lai, who was also in Chungking at that time. The extent of his more general relationship with the Communists is unclear, but he seems to have reported fairly extensively on their plans and intentions. Harmon has left a very detailed record of a conversation with Mao Tse-tung in 1946 which seems to suggest that he had met Mao a few times before.. It was Mao who apparently said to Harmon “I am not interested in Hongkong and I will certainly not allow it to become a bone of contention between your country and mine”     

Disarmament,with special reference to Asia

On February 20 M. V. dc Korostovetz read a paper on Soviet Russia and her Southern Neighbours. The subject was divided into four parts: (a) The general trend of Russia's foreign policy, which, whether Imperial or Bolshevik, has differed in method rather than aim; (b) the States from Turkey to China, lying to the south of the Soviet block, with special attention to Chinese Turkestan; (c) the Ukrainian attitude to Communism; and (d) an outline of the new canals planned to make the Volga the chief waterway of Russia at the expense of the Don, and, with the refortification of the Straits, to turn the Black Sea into a mare clausum.     

Revisionism and Its Variants: Understanding State Reactions to Foreign Policy Failure

States respond to failure in different ways. In light of the phenomenon of revisionist states, it is particularly important to understand why some revisionist states revert to status quo pursuits in the face of policy failure, while others pursue revisionism even in the face of external developments that we might expect would push them toward moderation. Domestic structure, domestic politics, and elite ideology each contribute to an explanation of how revisionist states respond to policy failure, but none of these variables alone tells the full story. As is illustrated through case studies of Iranian, Israeli, and Iraqi foreign policy in the 1980s, domestic structure plays the launching role in the analysis of how a revisionist state will behave. Regime type structures the incentives facing leaders and determines whether domestic politics or elite ideology is determinative in predicting a revisionist state's reactions to failure.