The statistical prediction of violent behavior

Considerable attention in the popular and professional literature has focused on the relative costs and benefits of using public protectionist versus civil libertarian models of social control. In this article, we develop statistical analogs of these models to predict violent behavior among samples of defendants found incompetent to stand trial in New York State. The societal and personal costs (errors of prediction) of each model are compared and their implications for clinical practice and social policy are discussed.This research was supported in part by PHS Grant MH 20367 from the NIMH Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency. The assistance of Thomas Arvanites in data analysis and the comments of Monroe Lefkowitz and Mary Evans Melick on earlier drafts of this paper are gratefully acknowledged.     

Stalking Aboriginal culture: the Wanda Koolmatrie affair

Hoax, v.t., n. 1. Deceive, take in, (person) by way of joke. 2. n. Humorous or mischievous deception. Fraud, n. Criminal deception, use of false representations to gain unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick. Imposition, (-z) n... piece of deception or advantage taking. Utter, v.t. put (notes, base coin, etc.) into circulation. History of a Deception Wanda Koolmatrie's novel My Own Sweet Time was published in 1994 by Magabala Books Aboriginal Corporation, an Aboriginal publishing house based in Broome, Western Australia. It is now known that Wanda Koolmatrie never existed, and My Own Sweet Time is believed to be the work, either jointly or individually, of two white Australian males known as John Bayley and Leon Carmen. As readers were informed in the biography provided by the publisher, Wanda Koolmatrie: was born in the far north of South Australia in 1949... Removed from her Pitjantjara mother in 1950, she was raised by foster parents in the western suburbs of Adelaide. She married Frank Koolmatrie, who died several years later...     

Agricultural self-sufficiency: The recent history of an idea

Summary and Conclusions It has been argued that traditional Third World reliance on commodity export production and trade as a means to accumulate savings for development is increasingly perceived as flawed. Post-World War II investment in light manufacturing by Western firms in the Periphery has also been characterized as an inadequate means of capital accumulation. Nationalist and socialist academics and political leaders in the Third World are voicing interest in food agriculture as a mechanism for economic growth; internal demand for food and other basic goods is considered a potentially more lucrative source of savings than international demand for raw materials and foreign investment have proven to be. Political trends in the Core area, exemplified in Left ideologies, and in church and voluntary organizations' strategies for giving, seem to reinforce Third World fostering of food self-sufficiency as a strategy for development. It is important to recall that intellectual trends, even if broadly based, do not necessarily represent or cause social change. The idea of Third World agricultural self-sufficiency is more pervasive than is its implementation. Nevertheless, current speculation about food self-reliance and its dynamic effect on economic growth in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, is new in development theory, and therefore worthy of note. Further study may reveal the depth of present interest in agricultural self-sufficiency and its likely impact on development planning.     

Selectivity on aid modality: Determinants of budget support from multilateral donors

Since the late 1990s a selection on policy approach to aid was advocated such that more aid should be allocated to countries with good policies, but there is little evidence that this has occurred. This paper argues that donors may exercise selectivity over the aid modality. Specifically, multilateral donors will cede more recipient control over aid by granting more budget support to those recipients with better expenditure systems and spending preferences (towards the poor) aligned with the donor. We test this for European Commission and World Bank budget support over 1997?C2009 and find some support. Both donors have given budget support to almost half of the countries they give aid, and it is usually a significant share of their aid. The principal determinants of receiving budget support are having a poverty reduction strategy in place, which can be considered a good indicator of aligned preferences, and indicators of government efficiency. These variables did not, however, influence the amount of budget support given. Multilateral donors have been more likely to give budget support to countries with aligned spending preferences and better quality systems, even if they have not reallocated the total aid envelope in that way.