Competitive Liberalization,Competitive Imperialism,and Intellectual Property

Aggressive pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) by major and minor trading powers alike challenges the conventional wisdom in favor of such pursuit – competitive liberalization. An equally plausible explanation for an active bilateral and regional trade agreement policy, one which effectively de-emphasizes multilateralism, may be competitive imperialism. The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights is one area in which new provisions, going beyond multilateral rules, are being negotiated and written into FTAs and CUs. Such provisions may yield insights into which characterization of bilateralism and regionalism – competitive liberalization or competitive imperialism – is more apt. Rice Distinguished Professor, The University of Kansas, School of Law, Green Hall, 1535 West 15th Street, Lawrence, KS 66045-7577, USA. Tel. +1-785-8649224. Fax. +1-785-8645054. www.law.ku.edu. J.D., Harvard (1989); M.Sc., Oxford (1986); M.Sc., London School of Economics (1985); A.B., Duke (1984). Marshall Scholar (1984-86). Member, Council on Foreign Relations, Royal Society for Asian Affairs, and Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. Author, Modern GATT Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2005), International Trade Law: Theory and Practice (2nd ed. 2000, 3rd ed. forthcoming 2007-08), and Trade, Development, and Social Justice (Carolina Academic Press 2003). I am thankful to my Research Assistant, Mr. David R. Jackson (B.A., George Mason University, 1992; J.D. Class of 2007, University of Kansas), for his indispensable help on this work. I also am grateful to Dr. Mohammed El Said, University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN), for his consistent support and friendship, and for what he has taught and continues to teach me about international trade and intellectual property.     

The view from below: Local government and Putin's reforms

Local government reforms in contemporary Russia are placed in the broader contexts of political reform under Putin and the historical relationship between local administration and the state. Reforms of local government thus help illuminate the architecture of contemporary state building in Russia and the degree to which contemporary Russia perpetuates political traditions. This study reviews the antecedent action in local government prior to the Putin era. It then examines the Kozak Commission and the new law on local government, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of these reforms. Finally, this study examines the challenges of implementing the reforms and what these challenges tell us about devolution and centralisation under Putin.     

RATE OF OFFENDING IN JUVENILE CAREERS: FINDINGS OF CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN LAMBDA *

This study examines changes in the rate of offending in a sample of 8,834 males whose official juvenile law-violating careers included 26,650 offense episodes between ages 8 and 17 The rate of offending of active offenders (i.e., lambda) varied substantially as a function of age, increasing monotonically with age. Lambda, however, was not related to the age at first offense. In fact, the average lambda was amazingly constant at each individual age level regardless of the age at which offending began or desisted. Results are discussed in the light of age-crime curves known from other data sets and from the perspective of developmental changes in the rate of offending as youths grow older.     

Having the cake and eating it too: efficient penalty clauses in Common and Civil contract law

In this paper we examine one of the areas where there is a marked difference between Civil and Common contract law, that of the enforcement of liquidated damages and more particularly of penalty clauses. Common law judges are quite reluctant to enforce liquidated damages, especially if they believe that they include penalty clauses which are not enforceable. On the contrary, in almost all European contract laws liquidated damages are readily enforced, as are penalty clauses when they are not manifestly excessive. Although most law and economics scholars have criticized Common law courts for the non-enforcement of penalty clauses, there is a sizable minority of scholars who have defended the Common law “non-enforcement” policy on the ground that penalty clauses are inefficient because they hinder efficient breach. However, and despite the merits of the arguments advanced by advocates of the non-enforcement of penalty clauses, we believe that Common law’s rejection of penalty clauses is inefficient. We further show that the Civil law solution to the problem is not only comparatively more efficient, but that it can also appease the worries of those scholars who are afraid that efficient breaches will be deterred. The solution that Civil law systems give to the problem manages to enforce the parties’ wishes and to avoid deterring efficient breaches. However, we point out that in order for the Civil law systems to take advantage of this superiority, the interpretation of their Civil Codes should be guided by economic analysis and the respect to the wishes of the contracting parties.