The Inner Logic of Exclusivism (and Inclusivism): Shapiro's Shadowing

Scott Shapiro, a prominent defender of exclusive legal positivism—exclusivism—has intriguingly (re)introduced a logical principle, the endorsement and rejection of which he (I take it) supposes can helpfully distinguish exclusivism from its contrary, inclusive legal positivism—inclusivism. It is an intriguing thought that principles pitched at such a high level of abstraction as this could distinguish between the two versions of positivism. My aim will be to test whether this principle—and associated principles—can do such distinguishing work.     

Deepwater or Troubled Water? Principal–Agent Theory and Performance-Based Contracting in the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Modernization Program

In the mid-1990s, the United States Coast Guard began planning a modernization effort known as the Deepwater program to replace an aging inventory of cutters, aircraft, and small boats. This effort involved a consortium of corporations to develop a “system of systems” to meet performance-based requirements and build the new equipment. This article examines the Deepwater program through the lens of multilayered principal–agent theory and evaluates the performance-based contracting (PBC) method used to alleviate strains linked to accountability from the principal–agent relationship. The findings help better understand the dilemmas prescribed from multilayered principal–agent theory and PBC by illustrating the accountability issues faced by smaller organizations when engaging in complex, large-scale procurement.     

Apocalypse Now!: From Freud,Through Lacan,to Stiegler’s Psychoanalytic ‘Survival Project

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - The objective of this article is to explore the value of psychoanalysis in the early...     

The US stay-behind operation in Iran, 1948-1953

This article explains a US initiative to prepare resistance forces for use in the event of a Soviet invasion or communist attempt to seize power in Iran during the early Cold War era. It begins by discussing similar ‘stay-behind’ operations in Europe in this era and the conditions that led US officials to develop one in Iran. It then explains what this stay-behind operation consisted of and why US officials eventually abandoned it. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the stay-behind operation in Iran differed from those in Europe and the important role it played in the decision-making that led to the 1953 coup in Iran.