Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan? New evidence from local property tax competition

This paper reexamines whether fiscal decentralization constrains Leviathan government. Using panel data for Pennsylvania, we compare actual property tax rates to the Leviathan revenue-maximizing rates for municipalities, school districts, and counties. Using spatial econometric methods we also estimate the degree of spatial dependence at the three levels of local government. We find that fiscal decentralization results in stronger intergovernmental competition and lower tax rates. We also find evidence of collusion among school districts that exhibit high interdependence but also high tax rates. This calls into question the current literature??s blind use of spatial dependence as a measure of intergovernmental competition.     

Virtual Civil Society: The New Frontier of Social Capital?

Although many scholars agree that social interactions within traditional social groups build social capital, there is less consensus on the benefits of virtual interactions for political engagement. Our research examines how interpersonal social group activity and virtual activity contribute to two dimensions of social capital: citizen norms and political involvement. We rely on data collected in the 2005 Citizenship Involvement in Democracy survey conducted by the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University. This survey provides unique detail on participation in both social groups and virtual interactions. Our findings suggest that social group activity and virtual interactions both foster many of the same positive aspects of social capital.     

Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits

It is well established that geographic areas benefit, in terms of the share of government spending they capture, from having a legislator with longer tenure, holding constant the tenure of other legislators. However, the implications of this literature for how the total production of legislation changes if all members gained seniority is less clear. Increased levels and dispersion of seniority within Congress generate a cartel-like effect, whereby legislators restrict the quantity of legislation enacted and increase the average price of each passed bill. The analysis provides a natural experiment to gauge the impacts of the emergence of the congressional committee system.     

Assessment of a video system for scanning DNA autoradiographs

A video based scanning system had been developed for processing DNA autoradiographs (T. Catterick and J.R. Russell, Lab. Microcomput. (1991), in press). Before the scanner was used in casework it was necessary to assess its performance. Test DNA samples containing fragments (alleles) of known kilobase size were run against the primary (Amersham, U.K.) calibration ladder. The resulting autoradiographs were processed with the new video scanner and also using manual, ruler based measurements. Comparisons were then made between these experimental results and also with the known kilobase values quoted by the supplier of the test samples.     

Return of the killer fish: accidental choking death on a bluegill (Lepomis macrochirus)

An unusual case of choking is presented. In this case, a 45-year-old man, while fishing and drinking with friends, attempted to swallow a whole fish. He subsequently asphyxiated as a result of upper airway obstruction.     

On the Measurement of Rent Seeking and its Social Opportunity Cost

Utilizing 4-digit industry data by county,we compare the allocation of resourcesacross industries in state capital areaswith noncapital areas. We are able toidentify which industries are expanded andcontracted relative to noncapital areas. Our results provide the first directevidence and measurement of the forgoneproductive activity resulting fromresources being reallocated toward rentseeking and interest group activity. Ourdata also allow us to measure total rentseeking, and also to isolate the extent ofindirect and in-kind rent seeking, whichcan account for part of the Tullockparadox.