Trust in Government and Subsidy Reform: Evidence from a Survey of Indian Farmers

What accounts for the persistence of inefficient subsidies? What are the obstacles to their reform? We examine the role of trust in government among farmers in explaining support for reforming India’s energy subsidies. The subsidies under study hold back efforts to provide a reliable supply of agricultural power and contribute to the unsustainable extraction of groundwater. This water-energy nexus in rural India represents both a poverty-perpetuating policy equilibrium and a crisis in environmental governance. Informed by interviews and focus groups, we conduct an original survey of 2010 farmers in Bihar, Gujarat, and Rajasthan and analyze this data on the preferences of “vested interests”—those most affected by potential reform—to demonstrate the crucial role of political trust, especially trust in the national government, in predicting farmers’ political support for reforms. Our findings have practical implications for environmental governance and rural development and contribute to understanding the political economy of social policy reform in a developing democracy.     

Violence in the family: An analysis in terms of interpersonal resource-exchange

Spouse abuse is viewed within the general framework of interpersonal relationships and is analyzed in terms of resource-exchange. Gelles' exchange/social control theory is expanded by incorporating Foa's interpersonal resource theory. This dynamic theoretical proposition classifies interpersonal resurces involved in interpersonal transactions. Based on Gelles' theory and Foa's classification of interpersonal resources, predictions are made with regard to situations in which violence, as a mode of exchange, is more likely to occur and suggestions regarding various modes of interventions are offered.     

Motivating Environmental Action in a Pluralistic Regulatory Environment: An Experimental Study of Framing,Crowding Out,and Institutional Effects in the Context of Recycling Policies

In designing a recycling policy, the regulator must choose among multiple instruments. Our study seeks to address the linkages between the choice of regulatory instruments and institutional frameworks, people's intrinsic motivation, and various attitudinal measures. We examined the behavioral repercussions of several instruments that are used widely in recycling regulation, using an experimental survey on a representative sample of the Israeli population (N = 1,800 participants). Our findings suggest that the design of recycling policies should be sensitive to the framing effects of varied regulatory instruments and to the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on the desirability and efficacy of the law. In particular, we point out the potential regulatory advantage of using deposit schemes over other instruments and of using private organizations as regulatory agents. Drawing on these findings, we discuss the potential value of using differentiated regulatory policies to provide incentives for recycling in societies characterized by broad heterogeneity in levels of intrinsic motivation.     

A Failed Manipulation: The British,the Oudh Bequest and the Sh i Ulama of Najaf and Karbala

Between 1850 and 1903, the Oudh Bequest channelled over six million rupees from India, through British mediation, to the Shi i shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq. It has intrigued historians the way that this sophisticated British tool has exercised influence and control over the Shi i Ulama in Iran and Iraq. However, the British became directly involved in the distribution of the Bequest in 1903, on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution. In view of the ulama's growing involvement in Iranian politics, and gross corruption among the distributors, the British saw the Bequest as a means to enhance their influence over the ulama in Iran. The political usage of the Bequest was a subject of a prolonged debate within Bequest bureaucracy. Disagreements often stemmed from different priorities, determined by local considerations, of British authorities in Iraq, Iran and India. In 1912 the British took over the direct distribution of the Bequest, abandoning their expectations to use the Bequest as a ‘powerful lever’ in Iran, and shifting their focus to enhancing their prestige in Iraq itself and acquiring the goodwill of Shi is in India. These policies were renewed with greater vigour after the British occupation of Najaf and Karbala in 1917. Overall, these British attempts ended in dismal failure, showing that charity, however generous, cannot compensate for the need of religious leaders to maintain popular support by distancing themselves from foreign patronage and tutelage. Moreover, manipulation proved less powerful than broader historical processes such as the rising national and religious awakening against foreign powers.