Diplomacy and intelligence

'Intelligence' as a discrete institution is part of twentieth-century government. It combines the skills of covert collection with expertise on certain subjects. Its differentiation from legitimate diplomacy is on the whole clear: intelligence provides information by special methods, diplomacy uses it. Nevertheless, there are numerous operational overlaps. Intelligence's overseas liaisons interact with diplomacy and foreign policy. Embassies act as intelligence bases and are targets for local intelligence attacks. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office plays a leading part in intelligence assessment. Some distancing between diplomacy and covert intelligence is desirable, but Western intelligence is less of a rival to diplomacy than has sometimes been portrayed. In Britain, in particular, intelligence's knowledge has not meant power.     

The justification of punishment and the justification of political authority

Philosophical accounts of punishment are primarily concerned with punishment by the (or: a) state. More specifically, they attempt to explain why the (a) state may justifiably penalize those who are judged to violate its laws and the conditions under which it is entitled to do so. But any full account of these matters must surely be grounded in an account of the nature and purpose of the state and the justification of state authority. Because they are not so grounded, deterrence and retributive theories are incomplete as they are typically formulated. The intuitions behind these theories can be satisfied in a variety of complete theories, i.e., theories that understand the justification of punishment in relation to the justification of state authority. A consequence of this is that at least some of the intuitions underlying deterrence and retributive theories can be satisfied at the same time by a given theory.     

Are bribe payments in Tanzania “grease” or “grit”?

This article uses empirical evidence from Tanzania to show that bribes there are not “greasing” but instead encumber economic transactions. The evidence suggests that bribe payments promote contacts with service providers, result in lower satisfaction with public service delivery, and result in less efficient public services. Further evidence against bribes as ‘facilitators’ is presented in the form of opinion polls and actions taken to reduce bribe payments. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Quantitative cross-national studies of economic development: A comparison of the economics and sociology literatures

For more than two decades, economists and sociologists have pursued parallel cross-national quantitative investigations of the determinants of economic development. These investigations have proceeded in mutual ignorance despite the often large overlap in statistical methods and data employed. Apparently contradictory findings have resulted, especially regarding the impacts of international trade and foreign direct investment. We find that there are two factors that account for these inconsistent results. One key factor is the use of different variables to measure international trade and investment, the choice of which is in turn driven by underlying differences in theoretical motivations. A second important difference involves sociologists’ greater preoccupation with more complex multivariate models versus economists’ greater willingness to focus on individual variables in multivariate regressions while viewing others as “controls.” A major finding of our survey is that when thesame variables are used, the results of economists and sociologists tend to be consistent, rather than contradictory (as might have occurred, for example, because of the use of different samples of countries or time periods, or the use of other variables included in the regression equations). We also consider some studies whose purviews go beyond economic growth to consider factors such as income inequality, physical quality of life, demographic change, and basic needs provisioning. Angela Martin Crowly is at the Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California 92717. James Rauch is at the department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093. Susanna Seagrave is at the U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. 20548. David A. Smith is at the Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California 92717.