Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War

Why the First World War ended in 1918 and not earlier remains a major puzzle. We propose a new theory that emphasizes how honor prolongs wars beyond what rationalist theories can explain. It argues that when honor is insulted, an affronted actor will strive to punish the offender. Absent an apology, the pursuit of a satisfactory punishment leads the affronted belligerent to ignore unfavorable battlefield information, hold logically irreconcilable beliefs, process information in emotional terms, and obsess over status. We predict that wars of prevention and territorial occupation are most likely to elicit honor considerations. We test our argument against an obscure episode in the war where Germany and the United States made peace overtures in December 1916. We demonstrate that honor concerns made Entente decision makers see German aggression as an affront to their honor that only the destruction of Germany's political regime could redress.     

Anomalous authoritarianism: what,which, why?

Research on autocracies has gained new momentum in the last decade. One element of this research is the observation that some autocracies are characterised by structural conditions that are normally conducive for democracy. These ‘anomalous autocracies’ have high levels of socioeconomic development and democratic neighbour countries. The study of these cases might expose factors that are decisive for autocratic stability and studying them might give us a better understanding of barriers towards democratisation. This paper contributes to the growing literature on autocracies by mapping anomalous autocracies during the third wave of democratisation, thereby paving the way for systematic case selection in future studies. A large-N analysis of 159 cases (1975–2008) identifies Belarus, Chile, China, Cuba, Morocco, North Korea, Peru, Singapore, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe. In a second step, the paper lays out a theoretical framework that centres on actors and institutions. Rulers must establish elite–elite and elite–mass interaction, and this papers argues that they can do so through quasi-compliance of elites and the masses based on traditional institutions woven into a dominant party. The paper uses the framework to tentatively examine the resilience of authoritarian rule in Swaziland and Morocco, two most-different anomalous cases. In both cases, an elaborate traditional institution has co-opted government, business and rural elites and coordinated interaction within elite circles and with the masses, in turn enabling the remarkable regime resilience.