Insider-controlled Firms in Russia

Privatisation Vouchers in Russia were heavily invested in the holders' own firms. Using data from a recent survey, we show that insider control in firms privatised in 1992-4 through the voucher process (as distinct from the earlier leased buy-out method) is insecure and dependent on managers' support. For employees, investment in insider control appears to have been motivated by employment income insurance rather than expected excess returns on the equity. Managers are predominantly the same individuals as before privatisation and display considerable hostility to outside investors, probably because they fear dismissal should outsiders gain control. Despite insider control, firms are shedding labour quite rapidly through voluntary resignations. Employment dynamics appear to be unrelated to insider equity ownership.     

School vouchers and academic performance: results from three randomized field trials

This article examines the effects of school vouchers on student test scores in New York, New York, Dayton, Ohio, and Washington, DC. The evaluations in all three cities are designed as randomized field trials. The findings, therefore, are not confounded by the self‐selection problems that pervade most observational data. After 2 years, African Americans who switched from public to private school gained, relative to their public‐school peers, an average of 6.3 National Percentile Ranking points in the three cities on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills. The gains by city were 4.2 points in New York, 6.5 points in Dayton, and 9.2 points in Washington. Effects for African Americans are statistically significant in all three cities. In no city are statistically significant effects observed for other ethnic groups, after either 1 or 2 years. © 2002 by the Association for Policy Analysis and Management.     

New Hampshire's tax-base limits: An example of the Leviathan model

This study views the lack of an income tax on wages and salaries and a general sales tax in New Hampshire as tax-base limits. I use the Leviathan model to analyze the differences between the fiscal system in New Hampshire and the fiscal systems in Vermont, Maine, and Massachusetts. Vermont, Maine, and Massachusetts do not have the tax-base limits that New Hampshire has. From 1957 to 1989, New Hampshire had lower state and local government tax and expenditure levels than the other three states, more rapid population growth, lower welfare expenditures but comparable levels of expenditures for several of the major public services, and a more competitive structure of state and local government.     

Which knowledge? Whose reality? An overview of knowledge used in the development sector

This article provides an overview of issues relating to the use of knowledge by development organisations. It starts by exploring the various definitions of knowledge that exist in a world of many cultures and intellectual traditions, and the role of language. It considers their relationship with each other and with the many and varied ‘informational developments’ – information-related changes in work, culture, organisations, and technology across the world. It argues that these issues pose a number of fundamental strategic challenges to the development sector. The second part considers where, in practice, development organisations get their information and knowledge from and identifies problems with many of the channels used. Its conclusion is that most current practice consistently militates against the type of relationship and type of communication that are essential if development policy and practice is to be anything other than an imposition of external ideas, however well intentioned.