Are Voters More Likely to Contribute to Other Public Goods? Evidence from a Large‐Scale Randomized Policy Experiment

Voting has been described as a contribution to a public good. Are people who vote frequently therefore more likely to contribute to other public goods? Does partisanship affect how likely a person is to engage in these cooperative behaviors? Although surveys suggest that the answer to these questions is “Yes,” few empirical studies examine these questions using observed behaviors. We examine them in the context of a large‐scale, randomized controlled trial to induce voluntary action in a common‐pool resource dilemma. During a drought in the southeastern United States, pro‐social messages that encouraged water conservation were randomly assigned to 35,000 out of 106,000 households. Frequent voters in primary and general elections (1990–2008) were substantially more responsive to the messages, but there was no detectable difference in the responses of Republican and Democrat households. Our results suggest that internalized pro‐social preferences promote action for the public good across behavioral contexts.     

The emperor's cloths of disclosure: Hot money and suspect disclosures

This paper describes the results of the analysis of the Dutch database of suspect financial transactions for the years 1994-1996. It provides a detailed insight into the money volume at risk, the reasons for disclosure and the persons and corporations involved. The results show that from the start 48% of the disclosed money reports had to be discarded as there was either no money involved or there was no crime-money. The remaining database showed that all the distributions were very skewed resulting in the conclusion that “few move little money and few move much” or 179 persons were responsible for 89% of the disclosed money movements. The paper raises some questions about the assumptions underlying the anti-money laundering policy and the requirements for designing an adequate disclosure system at a European level. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.