Willingness to Self-Disclose among Late Adolescent Female Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse

The primary aim of this study was to compare the willingness of sexually abused (n = 22) and non–sexually abused (n = 36) late adolescent women to self-disclose both general and sexual information to strangers and intimate partners. Results, based on a sample of college women, indicate that those who were sexually abused in childhood are less likely than nonabused counterparts to be highly disclosing of sexual and general information to intimate partners. Avoiding extensive disclosure of personal information to intimate partners may serve to keep survivors of abuse at a relatively safe distance from their own dysphoric feelings and suggests that mistrust of others is an ongoing issue for this population.     

Learning the structure of a simple rent-seeking game

This paper considers a form of the Tullock imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking game in which the contestants are uncertain about the value of a bias parameter in the probability of winning function. Beliefs about this unknown parameter are not constrained to be static; we consider two methods by which the players' prior beliefs on this parameter can be updated. First, we allow for information to emerge by considering the case in which the game is played twice, with the outcome of the first game known before the second begins. The identity of the winner of the first contest represents information which emerges endogenously that can be used to revise beliefs on the unknown bias parameter. Second, information can be produced outside of the model by an external agency; this gives rise to exogenous learning. We consider the consequences for rent-seeking in each of these two cases.     

Pressure and the division of a public budget

This paper considers the division of a public budget among competing interests. The planner determines the optimal allocation by maximizing a weighted social welfare function. These weights reflect society's attitudes to different recipient groups, and are not constrained to be constant. By exerting “pressure”, the recipients can attempt to manipulate the weights and hence influence the division of the budget. The amount of resources used on pressure, and the effects on the preference weights are calculated. An important parameter in the model is the elasticity of pressure, for which an appropriate estimate is presented from the case of competition for a share of a health services budget in Norway.     

Mechanisms for rent transfers: Subcontracting among military aircraft manufacturers

Models of prototyped and non-prototyped competitions for prime contracts from the U.S. defense department suggest that the latter are much more vulnerable to bid-rigging than are the former. Subcontracting data reveal that pairs of firms who have been rivals in major non-prototyped competitions have a larger number of subcontracts with one another than do other pairs of firms. The analysis concludes that subcontracts may serve as vehicles for division of the spoils of collusive bidding on prime contracts.     

Voting strength in the European Parliament: The influence of national and of partisan actors

Abstract. Most decisions by the European Parliament are taken by an absolute majority of its members. Some decisions however – such as the approval of the budget of the European Union – require a two-thirds majority. The paper analyzes the a priori voting strength of the member states when their representatives vote coherently. It is shown that the increase in votes for Germany in the 1994 reallocation enhanced its position. A less favourable effect, however, can be seen for the other large members (France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain). However, since votes in the EP tend to be cast according to partisan rather than national affiliation, the relative voting power of the political groups with respect to the two quotas is also analyzed. The tool to measure this is the (normalized) Banzhaf power index, partially extended to account for connected coalitions. The paper demonstrates that the distribution of votes between the present EU member states as allocated in proportion to their population size indeed roughly corresponds to their a priori voting power. However, the relative influence of the largest political groups, the European Socialists and the European People's Party, tends to be overestimated by their share of seats in the framework of the simple majority rule, but it is considerable if the quota is two-thirds. Finally, under the two-thirds majority rule, the European Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Party as well as the small groups appear to be almost powerless. The more the EP gains political leverage – a further increase in its institutional powers is to be expected in the framework of the ongoing Intergovernmental Conference – the more the distribution of voting power between the member states and between the political groups will be a crucial factor in the shaping of EU policies.     

The proximity and the directional theories of issue voting: Comparative results for the USA and Germany

Abstract In several recent studies George Rabinowitz and his co–authors challenge the 'classical' spatial model of issue voting, the proximity model, by introducing a directional model. In this article we examine whether different measurement of perceived issue positions of candidates or parties leads to diverging judgments about the predictive power of the directional model (which is claimed to be empirically superior), as compared to the proximity model, using data from the USA and Germany. The results demonstrate that the measurement preferred by Rabinowitz et al. tends to bias empirical findings in favour of directional theory. If we use a more plausible operational definition of issue positions of candidates and parties the directional model in both countries fails to turn out superior.     

Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross–National Adoption of Policy Instruments for Bureaucratic Accountability

This article examines different explanations for the cross–national diffusion of three recent innovations in bureaucratic accountability—the institution of the ombudsman, freedom of information legislation and data protection (information privacy) law. The first two explanations are based on the assumption that these innovations are by–products of modernization, either the growth of the state or democratization. The third assumes that policy is shaped through processes of international communication. A combination of methodologies is employed to conclude that while the growth of government and liberal democratic values are necessary conditions for the adoption of all three policy instruments, they are not sufficient conditions. The pattern of adoption observed is best explained by examining how evidence about these respective policies flows from adopting states to non–adopters. In the case of the ombudsman, this process can be characterized as one of lesson–drawing; for freedom of information, evidence is used for legitimation purposes; for data protection, the diffusion is attributable to harmonization through international organizations. Policy transfer is hence a multi–faceted concept that embraces a number of distinct processes of transnational learning and communication.