International assistance and democracy: Assessing efforts to assist post-communist development

This article surveys political development frameworks for analyzing the post-Communist transition to political democracy. Parallels with postcolonial events in Third World countries should caution against overoptimism about the prospects for mutually reinforcing economic and political development. In general, the study of Third World political development suggest that rapid regime transition with low mass participation is unlikely to result in sustainable democratic politics, especially where severe economic dislocations are present. High rates of participation during regime change may lead to rapid disillusionment with the performance of postrevolutionary government. It is thus argued that states wishing, for various reasons, to assist in smoothing the transition from communism should pay heed to the cautionary experience of Third World development assistance and monitor the political dimensions of the transformation, such as the stability of coalition governments, electoral turnout, ethnonationalism, as well as the orthodox economic indicators like inflation and rates of domestic investment. With respect to international assistance to the former Communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the article shows that the capacity of the Group of Twenty Four (G-24) donors to aid economic recovery is well below what is requested, or needed. Despite hosting a donor summit, the United States is taking a far less prominent role in the post-Cold War donor community than was the case in the analogous program for post-World War II recovery. This is having an impact on both volume and coordination of assistance. Finally, a strong, possibly ideological, preference among donors for finding private sector recipients for the bulk of assistance may erode the capacity of the post-Communist states to provide both infrastructure and political stability needed for investor confidence. Those making decisions about levels and modes of Western assistance should look beyond economic indicators of privatization as criteria for continued support and retain, where possible, political development objectives in both financial and project assistance. While we must not assume that the record of supporting democracy in Central and Eastern Europe will prove to be any better than in many Third World regimes, the greater security salience of Eastern Europe’s stability adds urgency to the task of applying political development lessons to the post-Communist experience. Malcolm J. Grieve specializes in political development and international political economy and in his current research is exploring the connections between the two fields with regard to analysis of the post-Communist transition. Recent publications include “Economic Imperialism”, in D. Haglund and M. Hawes, eds.,World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990) and “Debt and Imperialism: Perspectives on the Debt Crisis,” in S. Riley ed.,The politics of global debt (Macmillan 1993). ...in Central and eastern Europe, we are seeking to demonstrate in practice the idea that free government can mean good and stable government, and that free enterprise can mean economic opportunity for all.U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 27 February 1991. There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through, than to initiate a new order of things.Machiavelli, The Prince     

Need-efficiency trade-offs in the allocation of resources: Ideological and attributional differences in public aid decision making

We examined whether ideological differences influenced perceptions of the underlying causes of public aid applicants’ predicaments, and whether in turn ideology-patterned attributions accounted for how resource allocators prioritized need- and efficiency-related goals in allocating aid. To examine the need-efficiency trade-off, participants (N=112) divided a hypothetical pool of aid applicants for subsidized health insurance into two “incorrect” allocation outcomes: false alarms (allocate aid to unneedy applicants) and misses (deny aid to needy applicants). Moreover, to examine beliefs about the absolute percentage of aid applicants who are truly in need of societal assistance, participants divided the remaining aid applicants into two “correct” allocation outcomes: hits (allocate aid to needy applicants) and correct rejections (deny aid to unneedy applicants). Results of a series of structural equation models indicated that conservatism was linked to the causal belief that aid applicants’ predicaments arise from dispositional rather than situational factors, which in turn predicted a preference for making efficiency-related over need-related resource allocation judgments (e.g., preferring misses to false alarms) and the belief that a relatively small number of aid applicants are truly in need of societal assistance (e.g., preferring correct rejections to hits). Results are discussed in terms of how ideologically driven attributions influence the manner in which people resolve need-efficiency trade-offs inherent in the context of public aid decision making.