Political competition

Abstract Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two-dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period.     

Identifying Insanity Acquittals: Is It Any Easier?

Law and Human Behavior - Following the highly publicized insanity acquittal of John Hinckley in 1982, legislators throughout the country attempted to reform the insanity defense. At the time,...     

Right to die,euthanasia, and community sentiment

Three questions guide this research: Would nullifications occur in active euthanasia cases where the right to die is asserted? What sentiments would the community express, and how would those sentiments relate to nullifications? What variables would best predict verdict? Mock jurors offered reasons for their verdicts for four cases where all elements of first degree murder appeared to be satisfied. The cases varied thecompetency of the patient, theintent of the patient—if the wish to die was expressed, and whether a living will was present, and whether the defendant soughtcourt approval. Sizable nullifications (25% not guilty verdicts) and partial nullifications (39% guilty to lesser offenses) resulted. Some subjects viewed this as not a legal matter, but a private matter; others acknowledged the law's place, but viewed the law's position as wrong; still others nullified by using a common sense rather than a legal definition ofmalice. In this life-and-death matter, black letter law and common sense justice were not only far apart, but, in the eyes of some, irreconcilably so.     

Reviews

Roget E. Kanet (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, xii + 364 pp. hardback $31.95, paperback $13.95. Adeed and Karen Dawisha (eds.), The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives, London: Heinemann for Royal Institute of Interna‐national Affairs, 1982, x+ 172 pp. hardback £13.50, paperback £5.50.

David Holloway, The Soviet Union and The Arms Race, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983, x + 211 pp. £7.95, $14.95.

P. H. Vigor, Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory, London: Macmillan, 1983, ix + 218 pp. £25.00.

Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German‐Soviet Relations 1955–1980, Cambridge: CUP, 1982, xvi + 328 pp. £22.50.

Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books/Gower Publishing, 1983, xviii + 318 pp. £19.50.

David A. Dyker, The Process of Investment in the Soviet Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, vii + 254 pp. £20.00.

D. Gale Johnson and Karen McConnell Brooks, Prospects for Soviet Agriculture in the 1980s, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983, x + 214 pp. UK hardback £12.25, paperback £6.27. Elsewhere hardback $21.88, paperback $11.19.

Marshall I. Goldman, USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System, London/New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983, xii + 210pp. $15.00.

Ronald E. Hoyt, Winners and Losers in East‐West Trade: A Behavioral Analysis of US‐Soviet Detente (1970–1980), New York: Praeger, 1983, xiii + 238 pp. $29.95.

Paul Dotsenko, The Struggle for a Democracy in Siberia, 1917–1920. Eyewitness Account of a Contemporary, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983, xvii+ 178 pp. $16.95.

Abram Bergson and Herbert Levine (eds.), The Soviet Economy: toward the Year 2000, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983, xvi + 452pp. £27.50.     

Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule

This essay shows that, for any non-collegial voting rule, σ, there exists an integer, s(σ), with this property: if the policy space, W, has dimension no greater than s(σ), then there exists a profile of smooth utilities on W, such that the core for σ at this profile is non-empty and ‘structurally stable’ under sufficiently small perturbation. We also show how we may compute s(σ) for an arbitrary rule. This material is based upon work supported by NSF grant SES-84-18296, to the School of Social Sciences, University of California at Irvine. An early draft was written while the author was Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology. Thanks are due to Kenneth Shepsle, Dick McKelvey and Gary Cox for helpful comments, to Michael Chwe and Shaun Bowler for research assistance, and to Derek Hearl and Ian Budge for permission to make use of unpublished data.     

Limiting State Involvement in Foreign Policy: The Governors and the National Guard in Perpich v. Defense

The National Guard is a largely successful intergovernmentalinstitution in the United States. In September 1989, however,the governor of Minnesota asked the U.S. Supreme Court to strikedown federal legislation that gives the Department of Defenseauthority to assign state National Guard units to active-dutyoverseas training without the consent of the governor. In Perpich(1990), the Supreme Court upheld the Montgomery Amendment allowingthe president to order members of a state's Guard to activeduty for training outside the United States even during peacetimewithout either the consent of the governor or the declarationof a national emergency. The Court did not address the factthat the president has ample authority under other statutesfor calling up the National Guard. The decision dealt only withthe authority for calling Guard units for two weeks of active-dutytraining. The practical effect of this interpretation of themilitia clauses of the U.S. Constitution is to reduce the states'authority for training to, at best, a ministerial function,even when Guard units are called up by the secretary of defenseonly for the purpose of training.